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RECONSTRUCTING CONSENT
MARCY STRAUSS*
"Will you walk into my parlor? Said the Spider to the fly. "
Every year, I witness the same mass incredulity. Why, one
hundred criminal procedure students jointly wonder, would
someone "voluntarily" consent to allow a police officer to search
the trunk of his car, knowing that massive amounts of cocaine
are easily visible there?2  The answer, I have come to believe, is
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School. J.D. 1981, Georgetown University Law
Center; B.S. 1978, Northwestern University. As always, I am grateful to my dear
friend Erwin Chemerinsky for reading and critiquing this manuscript. Thanks are
owed to my research assistants Karin Necessary, Kris An, James Warren, Lisa Jones,
and especially Aaron Agness. This Article is dedicated with love and admiration to
my oldest son,Jeffrey Chemerinsky, as he reaches the age of legal consent.
' See http://www.bartleby.com/66/52/29152.html (citing MARY HowiTT, OXFORD
BOOK OF CHILDREN'S VERSE (1973)).
2 In case after case, students read about suspects who supposedly told the police
without hesitation to "go right ahead and search," when incriminating evidence was
obviously going to be discovered. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991)
(Bostick consented to search of his luggage where contraband was easily discovered).
One author, tongue in cheek, suggested that Bostick went along because he was feel-
ing guilty and wanted to be caught. Stephen Chapman, 'Voluntary' Consent and Other
Judicial Fantasies, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 24, 1996, at 23; see also People v. Reddersen, 992
P.2d 1176 (Colo. 2000) (defendant agreed to search of person and drugs were found
in pockets). Granted, there are times when a person consents to a search because he
or she believes that the contraband is well hidden. See, e.g., United States v. Zapata,
180 F.3d 1237, 1240 (11th Cir. 1999) (police had to pry the interior door panel apart
to find the drugs). Some courts consider how well hidden the evidence is as a factor
in determining voluntariness. United States v. Dortch, 199 F.3d 193, 201-02 (5th Cir.
1999).
This incredulity is not only expressed by law students. See Daniel L. Rotenberg, An
Essay on Consent(less) Police Searches, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 175, 187 (1991) ("What is baf-
fling about consent to search is why it is ever given. Why should anyone surrender to
the police, perhaps without a whimper, an interest recognized both practically and
legally to be the first order and often resulting in the discovery of evidence that in-
criminates the consenter?"); see also Paul Sutton, The Fourth Amendment in Action: An
Empirical View of the Search Warrant Process, 22 CRIM. L. BuLL. 405, 416 (1986) (discuss-
ing views ofjudges who find it hard to believe that an individual really consented vol-
untarily); Higgins v. United States, 209 F.2d 819, 820 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (no sane man
would be willing to let police search where contraband would be discovered); cf
United States v. Forbes, 181 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1999) (in evaluating credibility, the
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that most people don't willingly consent to police searches. Yet,
absent extraordinary circumstances, chances are that a court
nonetheless will conclude that the consent was valid and the
evidence admissible under the Fourth Amendment. Although
courts pay lip service to the requirement that a person's consent
to a search must be "the product of a person's free will and un-
constrained choice" in order to be valid,4 in reality that re-
quirement means very little. Typically, courts simply recite the
accepted notion that "the government has the burden of dem-
onstrating a voluntary consent"' without much further analysis.
Even if the court delves further, it almost always fails to consider
whether the coercion inherent in the "request" to search made
by a police officer should vitiate the consent. And courts almost
never determine whether particular races or cultures may be
particularly susceptible to such authoritative pressures. Only if
the police behave with some extreme degree of coercion be-
yond that inherent in the police-citizen confrontation will a
court vitiate the consent.
6
Why is this so? The real problem is that the idea of volun-
tary consent, if seriously considered at all, has come to be a de-
court found that it was unlikely that the defendant, an individual familiar with the
criminal justice system, would consent to the search of a car he knew contained
drugs).
' The Fourth Amendment guarantees people the right to be free from unreason-
able searches and seizures. Evidence discovered in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment may be suppressed under the exclusionary rule. See Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914) (Fourth Amendment bars evidence obtained in illegal search or sei-
zure in federal prosecution); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (incorporating the
Fourth Amendment through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to apply to states, therefore holding evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment is inadmissible in state court). As the Court in Weeks noted, "[If evi-
dence seized illegally can be used] against a citizen accused of an offense, the protec-
tion of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches
and seizures is of no value, and ... might as well be stricken from the Constitution."
Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393; see Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The
Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionay Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (1983) (discussing the origins of the exclusionary rule).
' Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-56 (1973); see also Bumper v.
North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968). In Bumper, the Supreme Court held that the
government's burden of proving "that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily
given.., cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of
lawful authority." Id. at 548-49. Consent was found invalid when the police officer
told the homeowner, a 66-year-old African-American widow, that he had a search war-
rant to search the house. At trial the police relied on the doctrine of consent, not the
warrant, tojustify the search. Id. at 546.
5Id. at 548-49.
See infra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
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scriptive question. The court at best recites factual informa-
tion-what the defendant said and did, what the police officer
said and did-and then makes some conclusory statement about
whether the consent was voluntary. What is missing from the
dialogue about consent is any normative judgment. Exactly
what is meant by "voluntariness?" Do we simply mean the ab-
sence of coercion? Are we concerned with the behavior of the
police-have they acted reasonably? Should the background,
experience, race, or beliefs of the suspect matter?
This Article attempts to rethink the notion of voluntary con-
sent. In Section I, the current law governing voluntary consent
searches under the Fourth Amendment is set forth. In Section
II, the problems with applying the voluntary consent standard as
currently understood are considered. There are three main
flaws in the law of voluntariness. First, I argue that the law of
consent is unclear and misguided. Specifically, I maintain that
the subjective views of the suspect are almost invariably ignored
by the courts. Moreover, recent Supreme Court decisions cast
doubt on whether a subjective or objective perspective is appro-
priate, leaving the current test in flux.
Second, and most important, current caselaw fails to con-
sider the reality that most people will feel compelled to allow
the police to search, no matter how politely the request is
phrased. Such feelings of compulsion are particularly experi-
enced by members of certain racial and cultural groups who
fear confrontation with the police.
Third, and finally, the current doctrine of consent inher-
ently fosters distrust of police officers as well as the judicial sys-
tem. Establishing viable consent relies on a process that at its
worst encourages police perjury, and at its best, distortion.
Judges are forced in many ways to either acknowledge the per-
jury or look the other way.
In Section III, I consider possible solutions to the current
quagmire of consent, and pose the question: why not eliminate
consent searches? Although I argue that there is strong theo-
retical and analytical support for such a position, I recognize
that the courts are not likely to do so. Accordingly, less "drastic"
alternatives that might make the law of consent conform to the
normative goal of ensuring that a search is the product of a per-
son's free and unrestrained choice are discussed.
Although the notion of consent searches has been accepted
for over fifty years, it is essential that the doctrine be re-
2001]
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evaluated. Although precise figures detailing the number of
searches conducted pursuant to consent are not-and probably
can never be-available,7 there is no dispute that these type of
searches affect tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands,
of people every year.8 And recent decisions by the Supreme
Court endorsing suspicionless drug interdictions and pretextual
automobile stops will only-magnify the problem.9 After all, in
7 There is no national clearinghouse for statistics on the number of times police
ask for consent to search. And obviously, the published cases that raise the issue of
consent are only the tip of the iceberg. For every consent search that ends up in the
books, there are likely hundreds that are never disputed, either because nothing was
found or because the defendant plea bargained and thus no evidentiary issues were
litigated, or even, in rare circumstances, because the person refused consent to
search! Rarely do individuals pursue administrative or legal remedies for an arguably
illegal search when nothing was found. See Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 197, 244 (1993); David Rudovsky, Law En-
forcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and Searches without
Cause, 3 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 296, 305 (2001).
' See, e.g., Harris v. State, 994 S.W.2d 927, 932 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (police
officer testified that he asked for consent to search every car he stopped, regardless of
suspicion). Another police officer testified that he routinely requested permission to
search any car he stopped for a traffic violation; in one year he requested consent to
search 786 times. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 40 (1996) (Ginsberg, J., concur-
ring). Another officer stated that, personally, he had searched in excess of 3,000 bags
in nine months. Florida v. Kerwick, 512 So. 2d 347, 349 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987). In
one city, it was estimated that ninety-eight percent of the searches were by consent.
Paul Sutton, The Fourth Amendment in Action: An Empirical View of the Search Warrant Pro-
cess, 22 CRIM. L. BULL. 405, 415 (1986); JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 17.01, at 241 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing estimates that ninety-eight per-
cent of warrantless searches are conducted via consent). As Professor Dressier wrote,
"Put simply, there are few areas of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of greater prac-
tical significance than consent searches." Id. at 241.
' There are two recent cases that increase the likelihood that the police will try to
utilize the doctrine of consent to search a person or their property. First, in Whren v.
United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), the Supreme Court unanimously upheld "pretex-
tual searches," where police officers may stop a car for the purpose of asking consent,
even on a hunch, so long as the driver commits some type of traffic violation. "By all
indications, pretextual traffic stops have increased markedly all over the country since
the Whren decision." Whitehead v. State, 698 A.2d 1115, 1117 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1997). And inevitably, these stops involve a police officer requesting consent to
search. Wesley MacNeil Oliver, With an Evil Eye and an Unequal Hand: Pretextual Stops
and Doctrinal Remedies to Racial Profiling, 74 TUL. L. REv. 1409, 1411 (2000) (typically,
"an officer making a profiled stop requests consent from the motorist to search his
car... even though the officer has no articulable suspicion that the search will reveal
anything").
Second, in Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991), the Supreme Court approved
suspicionless drug interdiction practices, which also significantly increase the likeli-
hood of police searches based on consent. In Bostick, two police officers boarded a
bus en route to Atlanta from Miami when it stopped in Fort Lauderdale. Id. at 431.
Without any articulable suspicion, police officer picked out Bostick and asked him for
his identification and ticket. Id. Although nothing about these items was remarkable,
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situations where the police lack probable cause, the only source
for a valid search will be consent. Thus, the time is ripe to re-
think consent.
I. THE LAW OF CONSENT
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guaran-
tees "the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizure" and that "no Warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause."1 By its terms, the Fourth Amendment does not explic-
itly require a warrant before undertaking a search, and the
courts have consistently recognized numerous situations where
a warrant is not necessary. This Article is concerned with per-
haps the most significant exception to the Fourth Amendment's
the police officer asked for his consent to search his luggage. Id. at 432. Bostick said
yes; the police found illegal narcotics in his luggage. Id. Bostick argued that he had
been illegally seized, and therefore, that his consent was invalid. Id. at 435. The
Court disagreed, finding that while a reasonable person would have not felt free to
leave (the traditional test for a seizure under the Fourth Amendment), that is not an
appropriate question here. Id. Bostick would not have felt free to leave even if the
police were not present by virtue of being on a bus. Id. Thus, the real issue, accord-
ing to the Court, is whether a reasonable (innocent) person would feel free to ignore
the police officer and go about his or her business. Id. at 436. In Bostick's situation,
a reasonable person would have felt free to decline the officer's requests or otherwise
terminate the encounter. Bostick v. State, 593 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1992) (on remand,
Florida Supreme Court found encounter consensual).
Many scholars have criticized these decisions on a number of grounds, including
the concern that the police will use the power granted them under these decisions to
target minority members. A brief filed in the Bostick case by the ACLU claimed that
among reported bus sweep prosecutions, all of the defendants were African-American
or Hispanic. JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;
PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES 380 (1999); see also DAVID COLE, No EQUAL
JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 21 (1999) (bus
stops and traffic stops affect minority community disproportionately). Statistics reveal
that traffic stops also disproportionately affect minorities. See Kenneth Gavsie, Making
the Best of Whren: The Problems with Pretextual Traffic Stops and the Need for Restraint, 50
FLA. L. REV. 385, 391-92 (1998) (in one study, seventy percent of all traffic stops in-
volved African-Americans, even though African-Americans made up less than ten
percent of the drivers on the highway; African-Americans were two times more likely
to have cars searched subsequent to the stop). In Whren, the occupants of the car
pulled over were black; in the "facts" section of the opinion, the Court's only descrip-
tion of the occupants was that they were "youthful." See Anthony C. Thompson, Stop-
ping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 979
(1999).
Io U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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requirements: searches undertaken solely based on a person's
consent."
The Supreme Court first recognized the validity of a search
based not on a warrant but upon a person's consent in 1946.12
But it was not until 1973, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 13 that the
Supreme Court clearly articulated the requirements for a volun-
tary consent search consistent with the Fourth Amendment. In
Schneckloth, a police officer stopped a car at around 2:40 a.m.
"when he observed that one headlight and its license plate light
were burned out."'4 Six men were in the car; one, Joe Alcala,
was the brother of the car's owner, who was not present.
15
When asked by the officer if he could search the car, Alcala re-
plied, "[S]ure, go ahead.' 6 No one was threatened with arrest,
and the police officer's uncontradicted testimony was that "it
was all very congenial.' 7  Alcala assisted in the search, even
opening the trunk and glove compartment. In the course of
the search, the police officer found three stolen checks wadded
up under the left rear seat. These checks were later admitted as
evidence against Robert Bustamonte, one of the passengers in
the car."
" The Supreme Court in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) held that
"searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a
few, specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
The precise basis for the consent doctrine has never been made explicit, and thus
there is some dispute whether the consent doctrine is actually an exception to the
warrant requirement. Most treat consent as an exception to the warrant and prob-
able cause requirements. See People v. Sanchez, 686 N.E.2d 367, 371 (Ill. App. Ct.
1997). Some suggest that consent searches really lie outside the Fourth Amendment
because when a person consents, that person relinquished any expectation of privacy,
and thus no "search" occurred for constitutional purposes. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351
(defining search). Others have argued that a consent search is justified under the
Fourth Amendment because it is "reasonable"-there is no harm to a person's privacy
or dignity if that person freely authorized a government search. See Thomas Y. Da-
vies, Denying a Right by Disregarding Doctrine: How Illinois v. Rodriguez Demeans Consent,
Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and Exaggerates the Excusability of Police Error,
59 TENN. L. REv. 1, 36 (1991).
" Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946); see also Davis v. United States, 328 U.S.
582 (1946); Bumpers v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968) (no voluntary con-
sent when police represented that they had a warrant to search).
1 412 U.S. 218 (1973).







Bustamonte moved to suppress the evidence on the
grounds that the search was invalid. The question posed to the
Court was "what must the prosecution prove to demonstrate
that a consent was 'voluntarily' given"? 19 In considering this is-
sue, the Court first considered the meaning of voluntariness de-
veloped in the area of police interrogations and confessions.
The confession cases, the Court concluded, yielded "no talis-
manic definition of 'voluntariness.' 21 Rather:
"The notion of 'voluntariness"'. . . "is itself an amphibian." It cannot be
taken literally to mean a "knowing" choice. "Except where a person is
unconscious or drugged or otherwise lacks capacity for conscious choice,
all incriminating statements-even those made under brutal treat-
ment-are 'voluntary' in the sense of representing a choice of alterna-
tives. On the other hand, if 'voluntariness' incorporates notions of 'but-
for' cause, the question should be whether the statement would have
been made even absent inquiry or other official action. Under such a
test, virtually no statement would be voluntary because very few people
give incriminating statements in the absence of official action of some
kind." It is thus evident that neither linguistics nor epistemology will
provide a ready definition of the meaning of "voluntariness."M
Finding no clear definition, the Court instead decided to
base its definitions of voluntariness on a consideration of the
competing policy considerations. That is, the Court held that
the meaning of voluntary consent must reflect a balance be-
tween the conflicting interests involved in police searches. On
the one hand, according to the Court, is the need for consent
searches, as evidenced by the facts of Schneckloth itself. After all,
here was a search that yielded important information that re-
sulted in the arrest of a person; without consent, the officer
would have been unable to search the car since he admittedly
lacked any probable cause for believing incriminating evidence
would be discovered there. On the other hand, and equally im-
portant, is "the set of values reflecting society's deeply felt belief
9 Id, at 223.
21 Id. at 223-24. Even the area of "voluntary" plea agreement borrows from the co-
erced confession doctrines. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (plea
needs to be voluntary, knowing and intelligent decision).
21 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).
" Id (quoting Paul M. Bator & James Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention, Interrogation and




that the criminal law cannot be used as an instrument of un-
fairness."3
Accommodating these conflicting values led the Court to
conclude that:
the question whether a consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or was
the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of
fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.24
In examining all the surrounding circumstances to determine if in fact
the consent to search was coerced, account must be taken of subtly coer-
cive police questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective state of
the person who consents. Those searches that are the product of police
coercion can thus be filtered out without undermining the continuing
validity of consent searches.25
Although the Court did not provide a detailed list of all the fac-
tors to be considered, it did mention that the suspect's age and
intelligence, amount of schooling, the officers' claim of author-
ity, whether the suspect was in custody, and the conditions un-
26der which consent was given were relevant considerations.
Moreover, and of primary importance in Schneckloth, the
Court addressed whether a voluntary consent requires that the
person know of his or her right to refuse the police officer's
"request" to search the car. Since the Court felt that it would be
virtually impossible to prove in most cases whether a person
knew of his rights, the question really was whether the police
had to advise a person of such a right before obtaining consent.
Thus, in Schneckloth, the issue became: was the fact that Alcala
was never told he did not have to consent relevant to or even
determinative of the voluntariness assessment?
As mentioned above, the Court's analysis in Schneckloth bor-
rowed heavily from previous decisions in the confessions arena.
Under the Fifth Amendment, a suspect must be told of his
rights before a confession is deemed voluntary. In the land-
mark case of Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that
" Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225.
21 Id. at 227.
" Id. at 229.
26 1& at 226; see also United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (discussing con-
sent when the suspect is in police custody).
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in-custody interrogation necessarily involves "inherently compel-
ling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will.
27
Thus, prior to engaging in custodial questioning, the police
must inform a suspect of his right to remain silent and his right
to an attorney, and must obtain a waiver of these rights.
In Schneckloth, the Supreme Court held that importing this
aspect of Fifth Amendment doctrine was not required under the
Fourth Amendment. First, the Court noted, coercion should
not be presumed in most consent settings because they typically
occur in non-custodial situations. Indeed, such searches "nor-
mally occur on the highway, or in a person's home or office,
and under informal and unstructured conditions" far removed
from the custodial interrogation context.2 Contending that
there is a "vast difference" between Fifth Amendment rights that
protect a fair criminal trial and the rights guaranteed under the
Fourth Amendment,30 the Court insisted that the "knowing and
intelligent" waiver requirement should not be applied to the
search context.31 Significantly, the Court was concerned that
27 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
2Id. at 479.
21 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 289 (1973). The Court in Schneckloth
maintained that "consent searches will normally occur on a person's own familiar ter-
ritory, the specter of incommunicado police interrogation in some remote station
house is simply inapposite. Id. at 247. This distinction appears overstated. Except
where consent is requested in a person's home, it is often sought in areas unfamiliar
and intimidating. How many of us feel like we are on "familiar territory" when pulled
over to the side of the road by a police car or two? Not many of us would find being
singled out in an airport or on a bus to be part of our comfort zone.
oId. at 241.
SI Id. Two states impose a warning requirement under their state constitutions.
New Jersey was the first state to require that the government prove the person knew
he had a choice not to allow the search. State v.Johnson, 346 A.2d 66, 69 (N.J. 1975).
That state stood alone for almost 25 years; in 1998 Washington State joined the fold.
See Washington v. Bustamonte-Davila, 983 P.2d 590 (Wash. 1999) (en banc) (inter-
preting state's privacy provision in constitution to require that officers inform home
owners of the right to refuse consent when police try to search their homes without a
warrant); Washington v. Ferrier, 960 P.2d 927 (Wash. 1998) (en banc). But see State
v. Johnson, 16 P.3d 680 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (holding Ferrier only applies to "knock
and talk" situations at homes). See generally Brendan W. Williams, Horizontal Federalism
Inches Along: New Jersey's Experiment in State Constitutionalism and Consent Searches Finally
Finds Company, 5 TEx. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1, 3 (2000) (discussing NewJersey and Wash-
ington rules); Smith v. State, 753 So. 2d 713, 716 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (suggest-
ing Supreme Court adopt rule that law enforcement must inform persons of right to
refuse or withdraw consent before undertaking a body search). A Mississippi court
issued a strange opinion, suggesting that Mississippi requires that the suspect be ad-
vised of his rights only in circumstances when the defendant specifically claims that
20011
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were such a requirement extended to searches, the ability of the
police to undertake consent searches might be thwarted. Re-
quiring warnings might interrupt the flow of questioning and
otherwise frustrate police efforts.2
Thus, Schneckloth established a vague, totality of circum-
stances test to measure voluntariness.33 Courts are to assess a va-
his consent was not knowledgeable. Gilbreath v. State, 783 So. 2d 720 (Miss. Ct. App.
2000).
Other states have considered and rejected such a requirement. See, e.g., State v.
Forrester, 541 S.E.2d 837 (S.C. 2001) (highest court finding no warning requirement
under state constitution and citing to other states in accord with South Carolina);
State v. Woolfolk, 3 S.W.3d 823 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (Missouri does not require a
warning).
Some police officers provide such warnings (or at least claim they do) even
though not constitutionally required. See, e.g., Reasor v. Texas, 12 S.W.3d 813 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2000) (police officer informed suspect he had right to refuse); United
States v. Hernandez, 76 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Pa 1999) (same); see also infra notes 151-
162 and accompanying text.
" Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 231-32. The dissent criticized what they felt was the ma-
jority's real concern: if a warning was given and people would be aware of their rights,
they mightjust exercise them. See id. at 287-88 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
The Court reinforced the notion that individuals need not be informed of their
rights in Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996). There, the police officer stopped a car
for speeding. The driver was ordered out of the car. After checking the driver's li-
cense and finding no outstanding violations, the officer issued the driver a verbal
warning and returned his license. The officer then said: "One question before you
get gone: [A]re you carrying any illegal contraband in your car? Any weapons of any
kind, drugs, anything like that?" The driver said no. Id. at 36. The officer then asked
if he could search the car and the driver consented. The search revealed a small
amount of marijuana and a pill later found to be a controlled substance. Possession
of the pill formed the basis for the arrest. Id.
The defendant argued that the consent should be deemed involuntary because he
was not told that he was free to go before he consented to a search of his car. The
Ohio Supreme Court agreed, holding that the allegedly consensual search of the car
was invalid, since it was the product of an unlawful seizure. Fearing that the shift
from a lawful traffic stop to a consensual encounter is so nebulous that a motorist be-
ing questioned would not realize it, the state Supreme Court established a bright line
rule, requiring that once a valid traffic stop is concluded, the police officer must tell
the motorist that he or she is free to go before engaging in consensual questioning or
requesting consent to search. Id.
The Supreme Court, 8-1, disagreed. Rejecting the constitutional necessity for
such a warning, the Court found that, like in Schneckloth, it would be "unrealistic to
require police officers to always inform detainees that they are free to go before a
consent to search may be deemed voluntary." Id. at 40.
By the way, Robert Robinette is white. David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Mo-
torists and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 Sup. CT. REv. 271, 320-23, n.241.
" Under the United States Constitution, the state must prove voluntariness by a
preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177-78
(1974). Some states have a different standard. See, e.g., LeFlar v. Texas, 2 S.W.3d 571,
574 (Tex. App. 1999) (applying Texas' clear and convincing evidence standard).
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riety of factors, including but not limited to, the behavior of the
police, and the suspect's own traits that might make the consent
a function of duress. The police need not tell the suspect about
his rights, and whether the suspect knew he had a right to ref-
use to consent is simply one factor to be taken into account.
Schneckloth remains the standard for assessing whether con-
sent is voluntary. Not surprisingly, this amorphous standard has
proven difficult for lower courts to implement, as discussed be-
low.
II. AN EVALUATION OF THE CONSENT DOCTRINE:
A STUDY IN FUTILITY
My criticisms of the Court's test for determining voluntari-
ness are threefold. First, the test itself is so vague that it pro-
vides little guidance to courts, litigants or police officers.
Moreover, recent decisions by the Supreme Court in related ar-
eas of the law have further confused the meaning of voluntari-
ness. Second, even if the test could be understood, it fails to
acknowledge the simple truism that many people, if not most,
will always feel coerced by police "requests" to search. To most
people, the request to search will be considered an uncontro-
vertible demand to search. Psychological research on individu-
als' responses to authority amply supports this proposition.
Most importantly, many members of certain races and cultures
never feel free to reject a police officer's "request" to search.
For them, a "voluntary" request by the police to search becomes
an oxymoron. Third, and finally, the consent doctrine is mis-
guided because it leads to a distrust of the police and the judi-
cial system. Each of these arguments is discussed separately
below.
A. A VOLUNTARINESS TEST IN APPLICATION: CONFUSION AND MIS-
APPLICATION
The test established for evaluating "voluntariness" is oft-
invoked, yet rarely do the courts invalidate a search based on
this ground. 4 Although the Supreme Court in Schneckloth sug-
" See Douglas M. Smith, Comment, Ohio v. Robinette: Per Se Unreasonable, 29
McGEORGEL. REv. 897, 937 (1998) ("Absent an unlawful claim of authority to search,
or some physically coercive conduct by the police, a defendant who answers 'yes' to a




gested that a defendant could try to invalidate the consent to
search based on numerous subjective factors relating to the sus-
pect's mental state or character, it is a rare case in which the
court actually analyzes any of these factors. Even more rare is
the case where the court finds them determinative and excludes
the evidence.35
I must admit to being surprised at the paucity of informa-
tion on this aspect of the voluntariness test. In researching this
paper, I started by reading every published consent case in the
last three years at both the federal and state level. I was looking
to see how the lower courts analyzed the various subjective fac-
tors in determining whether there was a viable consent. In case
after case, I found that the court simply recited a paragraph on
what constituted voluntariness and on the state's burden to
demonstrate that the consent was voluntary. I discovered only a
handful of cases-out of hundreds of decisions-in which the
court analyzed the suspect's particular subjective factors.36 Only
a few courts found them compelling. For example, in Lobania v.
Arkansas, the court conceded that there was no voluntary con-
sent when the defendant, who spoke no English, received a
translation from the interpreter that mistakenly translated the
police request to search into a statement that the police had a
permit to search. 7 The court's finding that this did not consti-
tute consent is hardly revolutionary.
Quite frankly, the results of my research confused me.
Surely some defendant must have "lacked schooling," or had a
low IQ. Surely some defendant felt that his or her prior experi-
35 COLE, supra note 9, at 32 (in most of the cases where the court found a valid con-
sent, the court did not even discuss the subjective factors deemed relevant in Schneck-
loth; when they mentioned these subjective factors at all they minimized them);
Adrian J. Barrio, Rethinking Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: Incorporating Obedience Theory
into the Supreme Court's Conception of Voluntay Consent, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 215 (1997)
(same).
16 See, e.g., United States v. Chavez, 75 F. Supp. 1015, 1022 (W.D. Mo. 1999) (court
went through defendant's education, employment, age, alcoholism and emotional
capacity and found consent voluntary); State v. Phillips, 577 N.W.2d 794, 804 (Wis.
1998) (same). United States v. Luna-Rojas, 28 F. Supp. 2d 54 (D. P.R. 1998); see also
Lobania v. State, 959 S.W.2d 72 (Ark. Ct. App. 1998) (same); COLE, supra note 9, at
32.
37 Lobania, 959 S.W.2d 72. The mere fact that a suspect may have trouble under-
standing English, however, often is not enough by itself. See, e.g., Semelis v. State, 493
S.E.2d 17 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (appellate court disturbed by fact that defendant re-
quired interpreter at trial and that he had serious problems understanding English
and was illiterate, but would not overturn district court finding of voluntariness).
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ences with police officers made him or her feel compelled to
agree to a search. Was it that the defendants were not bother-
ing to raise these issues, or that courts were not even deigning
to consider them on appeal?
31
Expanding my search beyond the last few years, I did en-
counter a limited number of cases in which the court more
completely analyzed the voluntariness issue. But, again, in vir-
tually all the cases, the court found the consent voluntary." As
Professor Cole concluded: "In theory, the voluntariness inquiry
... does allow for consideration of the different situations of
each individual approached. In practice, however, the courts
find consent to be voluntary in all but the most extreme circum-
stances."'40
Typical of the cases in which the courts found consent to be
voluntary despite arguments based on subjective factors is United
States v. Hall. There, the Court of Appeals found that the sus-
pect's low IQ (76) and psychological problems did not vitiate
consent when the police behavior was non-threatening, and
when the suspect's own actions in refusing to answer all ques-
tions addressed to her by the police belied any coercive envi-
ronment.
42
-" See, e.g., United States v. Rodney, 956 F.2d 295, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (defendant
argued, among other things, that he had been asked four times before by police offi-
cers in other situations for consent, and even though he had refused each time, the
police had nonetheless searched. While the court repeated this fact, no discussion of
it occurred); People v. Brazzel, 18 P.3d 1285 (Colo. 2001) (court repeated defen-
dant's testimony that he was manic depressive and therefore goes from cooperative to
depressive, but never referred to it again when analyzing whether consent was volun-
tary).
31 See infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text. Professor David Cole also provides
support for this position. He discussed a study by a Georgetown University Law Cen-"
ter student who reviewed all cases involving consent searches in the D.C. Circuit from
January 1989 to April 15, 1995. In every case the court found the consent voluntary.
COLE, supra note 9, at 32.
40 COLE, supra note 9, at 32; accord Smith, supra note 34, at 937:
Although the government is supposed to have the burden of proving that consent was
given voluntarily, in practice it need only point to the fact that the subject responded af-
firmatively to the officer's request for consent. Absent an unlawful claim of authority to
search, or some physically coercive conduct by the police, a defendant who answers "yes" to
a request to search by the police is almost surely to be found to have voluntarily consented.
969 F.2d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1107-08. The police approached the woman in the middle of the night in
a relatively deserted parking lot. Nonetheless, the court, calling these unavoidable
circumstances, believed that the pressure applied to the plaintiff was "minimal" be-
cause the officer was dressed in plain clothes, he did not brandish his weapon, and he
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Similarly, in United States v. Rodney, the defendant argued
that his consent was involuntary based on the following factors:
he was relatively young (24) and uneducated (10th grade), he
had been surrounded by three or four "large" officers, and that
four times before he had denied requests by police to search,
and that each time the police had searched anyway.4" The Dis-
trict Court simply concluded that there was voluntary consent
without making any subsidiary findings of fact." The Court of
Appeals provided a bit more analysis-but not much. It con-
cluded that because the officers did not draw their guns or oth-
erwise intimidate the suspect, the consent was voluntary.45
Significantly, in no case was a suspect's testimony that he
did not know of his rights and that the police failed to inform
46him of them found significant on its own. In only a few rare
cases did a suspect's prior experience with the police, or fear of
the police, lead to a finding of involuntariness. 7 Interestingly,
and perhaps perversely, prior experience with the police usually
worked against the suspect. Typical was one court's finding that
because the suspect was familiar with the legal system, she was
spoke in a conversational tone. Id. at 1107. This case was the rare exception where
the voluntariness issue was at least extensively discussed by the Court of Appeals and
the District Court. In many cases, the lower court simply recites all the facts alleged
by the parties and makes a conclusory ruling that the search was (or was not) valid.
See, e.g., United States v. Rodney, 956 F.2d 295, 297 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (pointing out
that district court made no subsidiary findings of fact).
, Rodney, 956 F.2d at 297. The courts do appear to be more sympathetic to chil-dren in similar situations. See United States v. Barkovitz, 29 F. Supp. 2d 411, 415-16
(E.D. Mich. 1998) (no voluntary consent given by crying child who was scared, con-
fused and confronted by four armed and large officers, some in uniform: "[child] was
merely acquiescing to the show of force presented").
" See Rodney, 956 F.2d at 296 n.1.
45 Rodney, 956 F.2d at 297.
16 See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 36 (1996) (at his suppression hearing,
Robinette testified that he did not believe he was free to consent; trial court found
consent was voluntary); State v. Hughes, 607 N.W.2d 621, 633 (Wis. 2000) (under
facts of case, failure to warn not significant).
47 One of the most egregious distortion, in my mind, of a person's prior police ex-
perience occurred in State v. Hughes, 607 N.W.2d 621, 633 (Wis. 2000). The suspect, a
woman, had testified that she felt coerced by the police. The Court held that the
consent was voluntary, noting that she had lived for over a year in a building that was
often the subject of drug sweeps by the Milwaukee police department, and thus, the
woman could not have been completely unfamiliar with the police! See id. Since
drug sweeps are not likely the epitome of calm, controlled police interactions, such a
holding seems disingenuous.
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less likely to feel coerced by the police." One Court of Appeals
specifically refused to consider a defendant's experience with or
attitude towards the police, stating that "an intangible charac-
teristic such as attitude towards authority is inherently unverifi-
able and unquantifiable."49
Rather than focus on subjective factors, those rare cases in
which consent was found to be involuntary typically involved
fairly obvious and egregious police misconduct. There were
four recurring types of police misconduct that typically led to a
finding that the search was not voluntary: threats to the suspect
or his family, deprivation of necessities until the suspect con-
sents, asserting an absolute right to search, and an unusual and
extreme show of force.
For example, one district court found no voluntary consent
when the police threatened a mother that they would contact
social services to take away her child if she did not agree to let
the police search.Y Similarly, consent was deemed involuntary
when the suspect was deprived of basic necessities; the police
told the suspect that he would not be able to go to the bath-
room-which he apparently desperately needed to do-unless
he let them frisk him first." Consent was found not to be volun-
tary in cases where the police essentially asserted that they had a
right to search,52 or when the Rolice started to search before
they even requested permission.
48 Id; see also United States v. Barnett, 989 F.2d 546, 556 (1st Cir. 1993); People v.
Gonzalez, 347 N.E.2d 575, 581 (N.Y. 1976) (consent by person "calloused in dealing
with police, is more likely to be the product of calculation rather than awe").
" United States v. Zapata, 997 F.2d 751 (10th Cir. 1993). In Zapata, the defendant
argued that his background and attitudes toward the police were derived from his
experiences in his native Mexico. Id. at 755. During the trial, he was asked, "why did
you allow Mr. Small to search your luggage?" The defendant answered: "Because I
saw that he was a police officer .... I thought that if I didn't do [what he asked], he
would get angry or he would do something else." Id. at 755 n.2. The Court of Ap-
peals held that the consent was voluntary. But see United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d
1448, 1454 (10th Cir. 1985) (court found significant defendant's undisputed evi-
dence that his upbringing and experience in Argentina "instilled in him an acquies-
cence to police authority. This factor is certainly relevant to the issue of coercion.").
50 United States v. Tibbs, 49 F. Supp. 2d 47, 48-49, 53 (D. Mass. 1999); accord
United States v. Ivy, 165 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 1998) (threatening to take a child from
mom is coercive); cf. United States v. Eggers, 21 F. Supp. 2d 261, 270-71 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (police threat to keep suspect locked out of house until consent obtained is
coercive).
See State v. Wilson, 600 N.W.2d 14, 17 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
"United States v. Nuyens, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1310 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (no volun-
tary consent when police had search warrant and had already conducted a protective
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Evaluation of the final area of police misconduct-show of
force-has proven somewhat problematic. While at some point,
a certain amount of physical restraint against, or a show of force
towards, the suspect will invalidate a consent, there is no bright
line determining when the police cross the line between accept-
able and egregious display of power. For example, in one case,
a court invalidated consent that was obtained after the defen-
dant was arrested, handcuffed, confronted by eleven police offi-
cers with arms drawn, and after the police had already begun to
round up his fiancee and children. Ironically, the court em-
phasized the police's behavior in "rounding up" the defendant's
family as particularly egregious.
Other courts have found consent to be voluntary even when
the suspect is "requested" to consent at gunpoint." In one case,
a suspect consented to a search after he was arrested at gun-
point, forced to lie on the ground, and while a gun was drawn
on him. Nonetheless, the court found that the situation was
it 16not too coercive" and that the consent was voluntary. In an-
other case, the court found consent to be voluntary even
though it was 1:45 in the morning, there were eleven police of-
ficers present, at least one police officer had his gun out of the
holster and pointed to the ground, and the police said that if
the suspect refused, he would get a warrant. 7
sweep, and defendant felt it wouldn't matter what he said); State v. Hall, 493 S.E.2d
718, 722 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (no valid consent when police officer said he would get
a warrant, and police officer did not have probable cause). But see State v. Johnson,
16 P.3d 680 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (voluntary consent even where police threatened
to get a warrant).
" Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); see also State v.
Sakezeles, 778 So.2d 432 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (consent was merely acquiescence
to authority when police entered apartment, chased the defendant into the bath-
room, pulled him into the living room and received his consent to search there).
54 United States v. Hurston, 12 F. Supp. 2d 630 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
1 See, e.g., United States v. Barnett, 989 F.2d 546, 555-56 (1st Cir. 1993) (voluntary
consent even though there were numerous police officers with guns drawn because
the defendant was no newcomer to law enforcement encounters). But see United
States v. Chan-Jimenez, 125 F.3d 1324 (9th Cir. 1997) (rare case in which court held
that involuntary consent when police had hand on gun).
56 United States v. Espinosa-Orlando, 704 F.2d 507, 513 (11th Cir. 1983); see also
State v. Stankis, 582 N.W.2d 468 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (voluntary consent even though
driver in car approached by only one officer during initial stop, but then approached
on both sides of his car by officers in order to ask consent; court's decision not af-
fected by fact officers testified that they always used this tactic to get consent, and that
they had never been denied consent to search).
" Commonwealth v. Paredes-Rosaria, 700 A.2d 1296 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (court
overturned lower court finding of involuntariness).
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In sum, a suspect's consent, except in extreme cases of ob-
vious police misconduct, is typically found by the courts to be
voluntary. Given that the burden to prove that consent was vol-
untary rests with the government,58 one might expect that estab-
lishing valid consent to search would be more onerous. The
evidence, however, indicates otherwise. The reality is that con-
sent searches are upheld except in extreme cases that almost
always focus not on subjective factors of the suspect, but on the
behavior of the police.
Why is this so? What explains the overwhelming attention
to police behavior and the virtual inattention paid to the defen-
dant's subjective factors in determining whether consent is the
product of a person's "free will and unconstrained choice?"
There are a number of possible explanations for the courts'
seeming lack of interest in subjective factors and concomitant
concern with objective ones. One explanation, of course, is that
the defense does not raise the subjective factors, or if raised, the
subjective factors are fairly and appropriately considered by the
court and simply (always) found lacking. Frankly, I believe that
there are several more likely explanations for the court's reluc-
tance to credit the defendant's subjective arguments.
First, the courts are probably ill-suited to make these deter-
minations. Deciding whether a person's education, IQ psycho-
logical difficulties, cultural experiences and past interactions
with the police render a consent involuntary is difficult under
the best of circumstances. And when undertaken by individuals
who typically share none of the fear, background or beliefs of
the suspects, it is not surprising that little weight is often as-
signed to these subjective factors. While it may be difficult for
"See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
"The inevitability that a judge's background influences the decision was recog-
nized by Chief Judge Benjamin Cardoza, when he wrote, "we may try to see things as
objectively as we please .... None the less, we can never see them with any eyes ex-
cept our own." BENJAMrN N. CARDOZA, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 13
(1949); see also Theresa M. Beiner, Wat will Diversity on the Bench Mean for Justice?, 6
MICH.J. GENDER& L. 113, 148 (1999):
The data compiled by political scientists is not entirely conclusive on the effects of diversity
on the bench. This is not especially surprising, given the difficulty of assessing all the fac-
tors that may play a role in judicial decision making. However, with more and more non-
traditional judges being appointed to the bench, more recent studies suggest that the di-
versity they bring to the bench has an actual effect on the outcome of cases.
See also Joel B. Grossman, Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decision-making, 79 HARV. L.
REv. 1551, 1552 (1966) ("[tlhe inescapable conclusion [is] thatjudicial decisions...
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a judge to identify with a suspect's background and experience,
assessing the reasonableness of the behavior of the police, how-
ever, is a more comfortable and familiar path for the court.
Moreover, the vagueness of the test itself, and the amor-
phous description of the meaning of voluntariness likely causes
the court to shy away from considering subjective factors. Tal-
ismanic phrases like "ensuring a person's uncoerced choice"
provide little assistance. Ferreting out coercion, moreover, is
not enough according to the courts; the determination of vol-
untariness must be undertaken with a respect for the appropri-
ate balance between the need to search and the individual's
rights. What does all this mean? It should not be surprising
that courts have difficulty applying such an amorphous test.6
°
Given that this "balancing act" inevitably takes place in the
context of suppressing evidence that was discovered during the
consent search, moreover, it is not surprising judges place a fin-
ger on that part of the scale that emphasizes society's interest in
promoting unfettered police investigation. Although theoreti-
cally irrelevant to the determination of voluntariness, the fact
remains that if a judge finds a search involuntary, she likely will
be suppressing highly probative and reliable evidence.6 ' The
defendant may have been forced to consent, but the cocaine
discovered in the luggage is no less real! In this way, the volun-
tariness question with respect to a search differs from the con-
are at least partially attributable to the personal values and experiences of the judges
..... ); Peter Lauricella, Perspective: Chi Lascia La Via Vecchia Per La Nuova Sa Quel Che
Perde E Non Sa Quel Che Trova: The Italian-American Experience and its Influence on the Ju-
dicial Philosophies ofJustice Antonin Scalia, Judge Joseph Bellacosa, and Judge Vito Titone, 60
ALB. L. REV. 1701, 1701 (1997) ("Ajudge's background and upbringing often influ-
ence his philosophy on deciding a particular case").
And through what lens do the judges view the consent issue? Although there cer-
tainly have been improvements in diversity, studies show that most judges are still
white, male and come from middle or upper class backgrounds. See also Laurie L.
Levenson, Unnerving the Judges: Judicial Responsibility for the Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY.
L.A. L. REv. 787, 793 n.17 (describing diversity, or lack thereof, on the California
bench). See generally Beiner, supra (discussing the amount of diversity on the bench).
" See State v. Stankus, 582 N.W.2d 468, 471 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) ("'voluntariness'
is an elusive standard impervious to concise articulation, and the criteria for volun-
tariness reflect a balancing of competing values"); see also Robert V. Ward, Consenting
to a Search and Seizure in Poor and Minority Neighborhoods: No Place for a "Reasonable Per-
son," 36 How. L.J. 239, 244-45 (1993) (Schneckloth did not provide sufficient guidance
on determining whether a person's consent to a search is voluntary).
6 "[E]normous pressure exists to ignore constitutional violations so as to avoid
suppression of the evidence." Rudovsky, supra note 7, at n.89; accord Morgan Cloud,
TheDirty Little Secret, 43 EMORYL.J. 1311, 1322 (1994).
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fession context. An involuntary confession is also highly unreli-
able.62 An involuntary search yields as reliable evidence as a vol-
untary one.
Finally, lower courts may ignore or short-change subjective
factors of the suspect because judges may believe that Schneckloth
has been overturned sub silentio, or, at a minimum, may be
confused about the appropriate standard to apply. Recent Su-
preme Court decisions under both the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments seem to be moving the law away from subjective
considerations and towards an objective standard. In other
words, numerous Supreme Court decisions since Schneckloth
have all underplayed subjective factors in favor of objective63
evaluations. Instead of focusing on the suspect's beliefs or per-
spective, the courts emphasized what a reasonable person would
believe, or whether the police acted reasonably under the cir-
cumstances.
Thus, there is at least some lingering questions as to which
perspective-objective or subjective-should be utilized in as-
sessing voluntariness. And the distinction obviously has pro-
found effects. Consider the situation in which the police arrest
a woman who appeared normal and coherent when she agreed
to permit a search of her car. Assume that at trial, the judge be-
lieves two things: First, the woman actually suffered from
schizophrenia, which rendered her incapable of consenting,
but, second, the police had no way of knowing this, and truly
believed that her consent was in accordance with the law. How
should the court resolve whether the consent was voluntary?
Under Schneckloth, the fact that the police acted "reasonably"
seems irrelevant, or at least insignificant. It is not a question of
whether a reasonable person (or police officer) believed that
she was schizophrenic and thus incapable of consent. It is pre-
sumably a subjective question: did the mental illness preclude
the woman from making a voluntary consent?
Yet in several recent decisions under both the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments, the Supreme Court rejected a subjective
approach in favor of an objective one that focuses on whether
the police acted reasonably. In the Fourth Amendment arena,
"Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986).
"See infra notes 64-82 and accompanying text. For an excellent discussion of shift-
ing perspectives, see Ronald J. Bacigal, Choosing Perspectives in Criminal Procedure, 6
WM. & MARYBILLRTS.J. 677 (1998).
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the Court considered several consent cases regarding third
party consent 64 and the scope of a consent search.65 It also de-
66
termined the meaning of "seizure" under the Constitution. In
all these cases, the Court opted for an objective perspective.
For example, in assessing whether a third party can consent
to the search, the Supreme Court held that a person who lacked
actual authority to consent may still do so if the police reasona-
bly believed the person had such authority.67 Similarly, in decid-
ing the scope of a consent search, the Supreme Court stated
that it should be determined by asking what an objectively rea-
sonable person would believe was the scope of the search and
not by the subjective intent of the person who granted con-
sent.61 In both situations, the Court emphasized that what is
6 See Illinois v. Rodriquez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
61 See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991).
66 See U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
67 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990). In Rodriguez several police officers,
without an arrest or search warrant, gained entry into Rodriguez's home with the as-
sistance of Gail Fischer. Id. at 180. Fischer, who went to the police complaining that
Rodriguez had beaten her, made comments about it being her apartment too, and
opened the door with her key. Id. Inside, the police found drugs and related para-
phernalia. Id. Rodriguez moved to suppress the evidence, claiming that at the time
of entry, Fischer in fact no longer lived there and therefore, was unable to consent to
a search of the apartment. Id.
The Supreme Court disagreed with this standard, holding that a warrantless entry
is valid when based upon the consent of a third party whom the police, at the time of
the entry, reasonably believed possessed common authority over the premises:
The Constitution is no more violated when officers enter without a warrant because they
reasonably (though erroneously) believe that the person who has consented to their entry
is a resident of the premises, than it is violated when they enter without a warrant because
they reasonably (though erroneously) believe they are in pursuit of a violent felon who is
about to escape.
Id. at 186. The Court remanded to the lower court to determine whether the police
reasonably believed Fischer had the authority to consent. (No such determination
was made; Rodriguez pled to a lesser charge and dropped the motion to suppress).
Rodriguez has been subjected to significant criticism. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies,
Denying a Right by Disregarding Doctrine: How Illinois v. Rodriguez Demeans Consent,
Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and Exaggerates the Excusability of Police Error,
59 TENN L. REv. 1 (1991); Note, The Theory and Practice of Illinois v. Rodriguez: Why an
Officer's Reasonable Belief about a Third Party's Authority to Consent Does not Protect a Crimi-
nal Suspect's Rights, 84J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 604 (1993).
6" Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991). A police officer stopped Jimeno's
car for a traffic violation and asked permission to search the car, because he had a
"feeling" that there were narcotics there. Jimeno consented, and the officer ulti-
mately found cocaine inside a folded paper bag on the car's floorboard. Jimeno
moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that his consent did not extend to the
closed container. The Supreme Court rejected his motion, holding that the scope of
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demanded of the police in deciding whether and where to
search is "not that they always be correct, but that they always be
reasonable. 69
Finally, the Court used an objective standard in assessing
whether the police have "seized" an individual and thus must
meet the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, or whether
there merely has been a consensual encounter, which does not
need to comply with the Fourth Amendment. In United States v.
Mendenhall, ° the Court made it clear that the standard for sei-
the search is determined by whether the police officer was objectively reasonable in
believing that the consent extended to the item or place searched. Id. at 252. The
Court concluded that:
the question before us, then, is whether it is reasonable for an officer to consider a sus-
pect's general consent to a search of his car to include consent to examine a paper bag ly-
ing on the floor of the car. We think that it is .... In this case, the terms of the search's
authorization were simple .... [The police officer] had informed Jimeno that he believed
Jimeno was carrying narcotics, and that he would be looking for narcotics in the car. We
think that it was objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent
to search respondents' car included consent to search containers within that car which
might bear drugs.
Id. at 251.
69 Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185-86.
70 446 U.S. 544 (1980). Sylvia Mendenhall was approached by two Drug Enforce-
ment Administration agents when she arrived at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport.
After they identified themselves, on request she produced her driver's license and her
ticket (which were issued in different names). She agreed to accompany the agents
to the DEA office for further questioning. At the office, she consented to a search of
her purse and her person after being told twice that she had the right to withhold
consent. After disrobing, the police found two packages in her undergarments; the
packages were later confirmed to contain heroin. Id. at 547-49. Ms. Mendenhall was
arrested for narcotics possession. She moved to suppress the evidence as the fruit of
an illegal search and seizure.
The plurality denied her argument, finding first that she was never seized. A per-
son is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of the all
the circumstances, a "reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave." Id. at 554-55. Here, no seizure occurred, the Court concluded, because noth-
ing in the record indicated that she was not free to end the conversation and con-
tinue on her way; rather the defendant accompanied the agents to the DEA office
voluntarily, in the spirit of cooperation. Id. at 555.
Nor was the search invalid. Since there was no seizure, the search was not the
fruit of an illegal seizure. Id. at 559. And the search was voluntary. After noting that
there were no threats nor any show of force, the Court turned to the subjective fac-
tors, finding that the respondent was twenty-two years old and had an eleventh grade
education and therefore, was plainly capable of a knowing consent. Id. at 558-59.
The Court emphasized that she had been twice told she was free to decline to con-
sent, which "substantially lessened the probability that their conduct could reasonably
have appeared to her to be coercive." Id. Earlier in the opinion, the Court had ad-
dressed and rejected the fact that the "respondent, a female and a Negro, may have
zure is whether a reasonable (innocent) person would feel free
to leave. The fact that the particular person involved did not
feel free to leave is irrelevant. Nor are those person's suscepti-
bilities or attributes considered in addressing whether the per-
son was "seized" by the police. 1
The notion that it is the reasonableness of the police behav-
ior, judged by an objective standard that is determinative, rather
than the subjective interests or desires of the suspect was also re-
inforced in the Fifth Amendment "voluntariness" context. In
Colorado v. Connelly,72 the Supreme Court held that there must
be a finding of coercive police behavior before a confession is
found involuntary. In that case, a man went up to a uniformed
police officer and confessed to a murder. After receiving nu-
merous Miranda warnings, he repeated his confession several
times during that day. At his preliminary hearing, a psychiatrist
testified that the defendant suffered from chronic schizophre-
nia and at the time of his confession was suffering from com-
mand hallucinations which made him unable to make a free
and rational choice.7 ' The Colorado Supreme Court found the
confession to be involuntary.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, finding that the
mental condition of the defendant, while a significant factor,
does not justify a conclusion of involuntariness apart from its re-
lation to official coercion.4 In other words, the Court held that
"coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding
that a confession is not 'voluntary."'75 Here, that condition was
not met, since the police officers who received the suspect's
confession had no knowledge of his mental infirmity and in no
way exploited it.
76
These cases have created some uncertainty with respect to
the appropriate law for voluntary consent. On their face, they
felt unusually threatened by the officers, who were white males." Id. at 558; see also
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
71 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555.
72 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
71 Id. at 161, 167. The suspect felt that God had given him the "choice" to either
confess or kill himself. Id. at 161.
71 Id. at 164.
71 Id. at 167.
71 One police officer did ask the suspect if he had been drinking or taking drugs.
The defendant told him no, but said that he had been a patient at a mental hospital.
Nonetheless, the police testified that the defendant appeared to understand the na-
ture of his acts. Id. at 160.
[Vol. 92MARCY STRA USS232
2001] RECONSTRUCTING CONSENT 233
did not overrule the subjective standard for determining volun-
tariness established in Schneckloth. Obviously, an objective stan-
dard to determine seizure, third party consent, scope of consent
and voluntariness of confessions can be employed at the same
time that a subjective one is utilized to ascertain the voluntari-
ness of consent. But these cases at least raise a question about
whether the courts should focus exclusively, or at least more
predominantly, on objective factors. They raise a question
whether police misconduct is a necessary condition to a finding
of involuntariness.
Given the uncertainty in the law caused by this overwhelm-
ing trend to focus on the reasonableness of the police officer's
behavior, or the perspective of a reasonable (innocent) person,
the court's minimal attention to subjective factors in assessing
voluntariness can perhaps be explained, if not understood.7
And some lower courts have explicitly decided to follow the ap-
proach in Rodriguez, Jimeno, Mendenhall, and Connelly. For ex-
ample, the Second Circuit has declared that the test for
determining consent is an objective one: "the ultimate question
presented is whether the 'officer had a reasonable basis for be-
lieving that there had been consent to the search."'' 8  The
The Court has not tried to explain or reconcile its competing approaches. The
closest it has come is a statement in Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988),
where the court noted that the "'reasonable person' standard also ensures that the
scope of the Fourth Amendment protection does not vary with the state of mind of
the particular individual being approached." No decision has tried to distinguish
Schneckloth. See Bacigal, supra note 63, at 687.
78 U.S. v. Garcia, 56 F.3d 418, 423 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting U.S. v. Sanchez, 32 F.3d
1330, 1334-35) and citingJimeno, 500 U.S. at 249; see also United States v. Murphy, 16
F. Supp. 2d 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (defendant was in custody, handcuffed, confronted
by eight officers; still, consent was voluntary because officers under the "circum-
stances had more than ample basis for believing that the consent was valid"). Other
courts outside the Second Circuit have also utilized a reasonable person test. See, e.g.,
Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (under the circumstances
a reasonable person would not feel that he had a right to withhold consent); Reasor
v. Texas, 12 S.W.3d 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (voluntary consent because police of-
ficer acted reasonably by letting companion go after questioning and by warning sus-
pect that he had the right to remain silent); cf Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d
884, 901 (Pa. 2000) (test for voluntariness is an objective one which takes into ac-
count the maturity and mental or emotional state of the defendant; test for volun-
tariness of consent and seizure examines the same objective circumstances).
The Fifth Circuit had also held that the reasonableness of the police officer's per-
ceptions or behavior is irrelevant, but the decision was before Mendenhall, Rodriguez
and Jimeno. See United States v. Elrod, 441 F.2d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 1971):
[N]o matter how genuine the belief of the officers is that the consenter is apparently of
sound mind and deliberately acting, the search depending on his consent fails if it isjudi-
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Tenth Circuit, while not going so far, did note that "while '[a]
person's subjective characteristics may be relevant to the volun-
tariness of the person's consent.., recent Supreme Court deci-
sions cast doubt on this issue.'79
Other courts explicitly have considered whether the re-
quirement of official police coercion acting on the suspect set
forth in Colorado v. Connelly should be imported into the consent
context. For example, both the Eleventh Circuit and the D.C.
Circuit have rejected an invitation to apply Connelly to volun-
tariness in consent.80 The Fourth Circuit, however, cited Con-
nelly when it held that:
[A] court's evaluation of the totality of the circumstances is based, not
on the perceptions of the individual searched, but on the coerciveness of
the officer's conduct in obtaining the consent.... In other words, the
cially determined that he lacked mental capacity. It is not that the actions of the officers
were imprudent or unfounded. It is that the key to validity-consent-is lacking for want
of mental capacity, no matter how much concealed.
More recently, at least one lower court in that district has held otherwise. See DeLeon
v. State, 700 So. 2d 718, 720 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (where defendant alleges that
his consent results from coercion or intimidation, the court must determine whether
the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not
free to decline the officer's request(citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438
(1991))).
See alao MichaelJ. Friedman, Comment, Another Stab at Schneckloth: The Problem of
Limited Consent Searches and Plain View Seizures, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 313
(1998). Friedman states that after Rodriguez
[I]t is the officer's belief that the suspect consented which must be objectively reasonable.
The court asks not whether the suspect's consent actually was voluntary under the totality
of the circumstances, but rather whether the officer reasonably perceived the suspect's
consent to be voluntary .... The suspect's actual feeling whether predetermined by indoc-
trinated obedience or a product of free will, are irrelevant so long as their outward mani-
festation looks like voluntary consent.
Id. at 323-24.
79 United States v. Zapata, 997 F.2d 751, 759 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting United
States v. Bloom, 975 F.2d 1447, 1455 n.9 (10th Cir. 1992)). But see State v. Pierce, 709
N.E.2d 203, 207 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (recognizing that the standard for determining
voluntariness is subjective, unlike the objectively reasonable person test for seizure).
'0 See United States v. Hall, 969 F.2d 1102, 1108 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Tukes v.
Dugger, 911 F.2d 508, 516-17 n.13 (11th Cir. 1990); see also State v. Sondergaard, 938
P.2d 351, 354 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (Connelly has not overruled or modified Schneck-
loth); cf United States v. Park-Swallow, 2000 WL 821383 (D. Kan. 2000) (relevant fac-
tors for voluntary consent include police officer's use of threats, and physical and
mental condition and capacity of defendant); United States v. Pena, 143 F.3d 1363,
1367 (10th Cir. 1998 ) (same).
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relevant question is not whether the person whose consent is sought per-
ceived coercion but, rather, whether there actually was coercion."'
And one Sixth Circuit case-decided prior to Connelly---also
held that improper coercion on the part of the police was a
necessary condition to a finding of involuntariness: "[T] he de-
fendant must show more than a subjective belief of coercion,
but also some objectively improper action on the part of the po-
lice." 2 A defendant's subjective belief is not enough to negate
voluntariness.
In sum, the voluntariness standard set forth in Schneckloth
has led to confusion at best and inadequate protection for sus-
pects' Fourth Amendment rights at worst. It is poorly under-
stood, and in practice, the subjective factors emphasized in
Schneckloth are often ignored or minimized. Only in extreme
cases of police misconduct have courts seemed willing to invali-
date consent. This failure to give any substantial weight to sub-
jective factors will likely continue as courts attempt to reconcile
the "voluntariness" test set forth in Schneckloth with more recent
decisions on third party consent, the scope of consent, and the
voluntariness of confessions.
And yet, perhaps the greatest criticism of the voluntariness
test is not simply that it is misunderstood or confusing. Even if
the type of subjective factors described in Schneckloth were fully
appreciated by the courts, the voluntariness standard could still
be criticized for ignoring the most significant factor of all: the
inevitability that individuals will feel coerced simply by virtue of
dealing with an authority figure like the police." Moreover, the
law fails to acknowledge the subjective reaction of people of
color, who may feel that they have no choice but to obey even a
"request" from a police officer."
" United States v. Quezada, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 22712, at *2 (4th Cir. 1991)
(emphasis in original).
812 United States v. Crowder, 62 F.3d 782, 787 (6th Cir. 1995). But see United States
v. Worley, 193 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that defendant did not confess vol-
untarily when he said, "[y]ou've got the badge, I guess you can," after court noted
that there was no evidence of overt duress or coercion, and there was no lengthy de-
tention or visible weapons).
"See infra notes 85-108 and accompanying text.
84 See infra notes 117-125 and accompanying text.
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B. THE FICTION OF CONSENT: AUTHORITARIAN DILEMMA AND
RACIAL CONSIDERATIONS
Numerous scholars and even judges have made the very ba-
sic observation that most people would not feel free to deny a
request by a police officer. Even in the "best" of circum-
stances-a polite officer, without gun drawn, familiar circum-
stances for the consenter-people consent in situations where
they only have something to lose. As one scholar put it, "com-
mon sense teaches that most of us do not have the chutzpah or
stupidity to tell a police officer to 'get lost.'
85
This common sense proposition has received a fair amount
of scholarly attention. One author recently attempted to em-
ploy psychological experiments on obedience to authority to
support the notion that "people mechanically obey legitimate
authority" and thus that "man's innate tendency to obey author-
ity can impair his decision making and, ultimately, dull the un-
derstanding with which he exercises his constitutional rights. 8 6
The psychology experiments, conducted by Stanley Milgram87
and Leonard Bickman,88 together support the general idea that
obedience to authority is deeply ingrained, that people will obey
authority even when it is not in their own best interest to do so,
and that obedience increases with when the authority figure has
visible trappings of authority, such as a uniform. 9
Milgram's experiments at Yale University revealed that adult
subjects display surprisingly high obedience to an authority fig-
ure, even when the actions of the subjects appeared to inflict se-
vere pain upon a mock victim. Specifically, experimenters
directed subjects to give progressively stronger electrical shocks
to experimental learners if the learners failed to give correct re-
plies to simple word-pair learning tasks.9 ° An actor-a confed-
erate of the experimenter-was strapped in a chair with his
" Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters "--Some Preliminary Thoughts about
Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 250 (1991).
Professor Maclin was speaking specifically about seizures, but the same analysis would
apply to consent doctrine. See COLE, supra note 9, at 28 (like the test for identifying
seizures, the court has created a standard that effectively ensures coercion of involun-
tary consent).
86 Barrio, supra note 35, at 231.
'7 STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO Au~oarrI 13-26 (1974).
8 Leonard Bickman, The Social Power of a Uniform, 4 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 47
(1974).
89 Id.
90 MILGRAM, supra note 87, at 19-21.
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arms restrained, and a subject was "selected" to be a teacher."'
Each actor pretended to fail the learning task so that the
teacher was under the directive to administer a shock as nega-
tive feedback for failure to perform.92
The degree of obedience in continuing to administer
shocks was measured in four situations of differing proximity,
from a separate room to direct hand-to-hand contact between
the subject and the "learner."93 In each setup, the "learner"
gave stronger and stronger verbal protests as increasing voltage
was applied, including a scream of great distress and a statement
of withdrawal from the experiment at 300 volts, and a final
scream of pain at 315 volts.
94
Milgram asked a variety of sources, including psychiatrists,
to predict how far subjects would go as they applied increasingly
strong shocks. Most predicted that subjects would refuse to
obey the experimenter when the shocks obviously hurt another
person.95 However, such predictions proved inaccurate; subjects
obeyed experimenters even when they heard that the "learner"
had a heart condition. With no visual cues about the distress of
the learner, 65% of the subjects continued to deliver shocks to
the maximum level, 450 volts.9 6 With vocal cues alone, 62.5% of
the subjects delivered shocks to the maximum value.97 When
confronted with victims in the same room, the percentage that
shocked to the maximum dropped to 40%, and when required
to have tactile contact, just 30% of the subjects reached the
maximal shock.9
Milgram concluded that the unexpectedly high levels of
obedience to authority derived from three basic factors. First,
subjects have learned to obey authority figures most of their
lives, from parents in the family to teachers in the classroom.99




' Id, at 22-23.
" Id. at 27-31. This is similar to the assumption made by some judges that that
suspects who do not want the police to search will simply deny police officers that op-
portunity.
"' &d. at 35 tbl.2.
97 Id.




perimenters, not as the principle directors of the administration
of shocks.'00 Third, each subject brought traits that encouraged
obedience, including politeness, a desire to adhere to the
agreement with the researcher, anxiety, awkwardness at the
prospect of stopping, and a tendency to continue in an experi-
ment set up in a series of small steps. 0
In another classic study, Leonard Bickman investigated how
the type of dress of individuals directing pedestrians to carry out
simple tasks affected the degree of compliance to simple com-
mands from a uniformed or non-uniformed individual. 02 In a
series of experiments, Bickman first tested 153 adults in Brook-
lyn for their degree of obedience to simple commands: pick up
a piece of trash, provide a dime for a parking meter, and move
away from a specified area within a public bus stop zone. 3
Bickman discovered that adult pedestrians obeyed young
men wearing either a higher authority uniform or a lower
authority uniform at a statistically significant increased rate than
actors who wore a sports jacket and tie when commanding the
experimental subjects.0 Those wearing a guard's uniform
(even without a weapon) achieved significantly increased com-
pliance than actors who wore either a milkman's uniform or a
jacket and tie. 5 For example, 82% of the subjects picked up
trash when the "guard" directed them, versus 64% when a
"milkman" told them to, and 36% when a civilian so directed. 6
Similarly, 89% attempted to comply with a guard's request to
find pocket change for someone else's parking meter, versus
57% and 33% compliance with a milkman and civilian request,
respectively. 0 7 Even with an unreasonable demand to leave an
'00 Id. at 143-52.
101 Id.
102 Bickman, supa note 88. The uniforms ranged from a civilian sports jacket and
tie, to a milkman, to a guard's uniform which resembled a police officer's but without
a gun and with a different badge and insignia. Id. at 49. Bickman also conducted an
experiment on 141 Smith College students to determine how well they could predict
compliance with commands given by figures in the three types of garb. The students
predicted no statistically significant effect from the presence of uniforms. These pre-
dictions proved woefully inaccurate. Id. at 57. See infra notes 104-08 and accompany-
ing text; see also Brad J. Bushman, Perceived Symbols of Authority and Their Influence on
Compliance 14J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 501-508 (1984).
103 Bickman, supra note 88 at 50.
4 d. at 50-51 tbl.1.
05 Id. at51 tbl.1.




appropriate bus stop waiting area, 56% of the subjects complied
with "guard" given instructions, versus 20-21% compliance with
lower authority uniforms or no uniforms.108
These experiments, while fascinating, do not definitively
prove the inherent coerciveness of police-citizen encounters.
There are two main problems with importing the conclusions of
the experiments to the voluntariness debate. First, the experi-
ments may have limited utility to the consent situation, which
involves a suspect who has so much to lose personally by con-
ceding to the officer. Perhaps it could be argued that the desire
to please authority breaks down when an individual personally
suffers in a very concrete way-by providing the evidence for his
own conviction. In other words, in the Milgram experiment fol-
lowing the orders of the authority figure led to discomfort and
emotional trauma for the subjects, who acted contrary to their
own inner values. Acceding to authority in the Bickman study
meant the loss of an insignificant amount of change, or a minor
inconvenience. While these are costs to a person, they are un-
doubtedly less serious a loss than the realization that allowing a
search will almost undoubtedly lead to the discovery of incrimi-
nating evidence lying there in plain sight, and thus result in an
arrest and likely incarceration.
There is obviously a distinction between the willingness to
endure some degree of emotional trauma or minor inconven-
ience and facing the tangible, severe consequences of arrest and
likely conviction. My point is simply that the distinction in the
degree of consequences may make analogizing between the re-
actions of persons to authority in the Milgram and Bickman ex-
periments and police-citizen encounters problematic.
While the magnitude of harm to individuals in situations
where police request to search may provide some hesitation in
applying the lessons of the experiments, I believe the studies
can still provide useful insight. The point is that people follow
or obey a "request" made by police officers in authority posi-
tions in situations where there is not only no ostensible benefit
to do so, there is likely harm. While the consequences to the
individual consenter may be greater than those suffered in Mil-
108 Id. This relocating from a location where they have a right to be may be most
analogous to the people who accede to a search request even when they have reserva-
tions about its legality or appropriateness.
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gram and Bickman, the behavior appears the same. Thus, while
imperfect, the study provides a viable explanation.m
A second possible limit to analogizing the Milgram and
Bickman experiments to the consent scenario is a more basic
methodological attack. The psychology experiments involved
clear demands to do something by authority figures, not simply
requests by those figures. For example, in Milgram, the author-
ity figure would say things like "the experiment requires that
you continue," and "it is essential that you continue," and event . ,'110
"you have no choice but to continue if the subject was waver-
ing. Bickman's experiment also involved situations where the
authority figure demanded persons to do something rather than
simply requested a favor. Thus, it can be argued that these stud-
ies are not analogous to the consent situation because persons
may comply with a "demand" but still refuse to go along with a
"request." There may be obedience to a direct order by an
authority figure, but greater ability to resist a "request" issued by
that same person.
In other words, these experiments do not make the essen-
tial leap: will persons perceive a request as a demand because it
is made by a person in a position of authority-and therefore
automatically comply? It is this latter point-that people auto-
matically comply with authority figures' demands-that the ex-
periments document, not the critical question of whether there
is a "demand" in the first place.
So, the question becomes: do individuals read a police offi-
cer's request as a demand that they will (according to the ex-
periments) most assuredly obey? While the Milgram and
Bickman experiments do not speak to this particular point,
there is abundant evidence supporting such a proposition.
109 As Professor Lassiter noted, "[tlhe dearth of independent private reasons to
consent to a search is the best intuitive evidence of the actual and perceived power
imbalance between the law enforcement officer and the private citizen in the routine
traffic stop." Christo Lassiter, Eliminating Consent from the Lexicon of Traffic Stop Interro-
gations, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 79, 130 (1998); see also Robert V. Ward, Jr., Consensual
Searches, the Fairytale that Became a Nightmare: Fargo Lessons Concerning Police Initiated En-
counters, 15 TOURO L. REV. 451, 472 (1999):
Both the obedience and social power of the uniform theories point out that absent some
kind of preliminary warning, the average citizen will find it nearly impossible to tell an ap-
proaching officer that, "I don't want to talk with you now." It defies logic to characterize
such meetings as being consensual encounters which may subsequently lead to the volun-
tary relinquishing ... of important constitutional rights.
.. See Milgram, supra note 87.
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First, there is testimony by defendants that they perceived a re-
quest to search not as an option but as an imperative."' Such a
reaction, moreover, should not seem surprising. In everyday
life, demands are often phrased as polite requests. For exam-
ple, if a police officer came up to a person about to park his car
and said, "Would you mind moving your car?", most persons
would do so, believing that they had to move their car. In an
employment setting, a boss may "ask" a secretary politely to get
coffee: "Would you mind bringing me some coffee?" But I
doubt many secretaries would feel that this question was really a
request, or that they could answer "no" and still keep theirjobs.
Moreover, numerous judges have acknowledged that citi-
zens would view the request to search as a demand when it
comes from an authority figure. For example, one court recog-
nized that "many persons, perhaps most, would view the request
of a police officer to make a search as having the force of law."
11 The Ninth Circuit recently came close to recognizing this
principle as well."' The court found that consent was involun-
tary because one officer asked permission for consent while his
hand rested on his gun."' Such a situation, the court con-
cluded, is "implicitly coercive"-the request for permission to
search would be viewed as a command, not a request.11 5 Al-
"' In those few cases where defendants raise this issue and claim that they felt they
had no choice, it is typically ignored or given no weight by the courts. See, e.g., Mel-
ton v. State, 705 N.E. 2d 564, 567 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). In Melton, the defendant, a
female, testified that she was intimidated and felt that she could not refuse. The
court summarily concluded that her testimony did not outweigh evidence of volun-
tariness, which was that she had said "all right" and that she helped the police by
opening drawers and moving items at the officer's request. Id. at 567; see also United
States v. Tucker, 57 F. Supp. 503, 513 (W.D. Tenn. 1999) (court simply found testi-
mony that she felt she had no choice not to be credible). But see United States v.
Worley, 193 F.3d 380, 386 (6th Cir. 1999) (suspect's statement: "[y]ou've got the
badge, I guess you can" not unequivocal statement of free and voluntary consent).
I have spoken informally to numerous individuals outside of the legal field, in-
cluding women from upper class, white backgrounds, and white, middle class teenag-
ers, and virtually all were surprised that people had the right to turn down a police
"request" to search.
12 State v.Johnson, 346 A.2d 66, 68 (NJ. 1975); accord Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 289 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Cleckley, 738
A.2d 427, 434 (Pa. 1999) (NigroJ., dissenting); cf Worley, 193 F.3d at 386 (accepting
defendant's statement in response to a search request-" [y] ou've got the badge, I
guess you can," as simply acquiescing to officer's authority).
"' United States v. Chan-Jiminez, 125 F.3d 1324, 1325 (9th Cir. 1997).
114 Id
.. Id at 1327-28.
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though the court emphasized the hand being on the gun, this
seems to be one small step removed from recognizing that at
least police officers in uniform convey such authority and power
that requests for consent are construed as demands.
Finally, from a linguistic perspective, there is strong support
for the conclusion that people will view requests from the police
as commands. As Professor Peter Tiersma wrote:
When someone in a position of power and authority makes what is liter-
ally a request to a subordinate, and the person in power has the right to
command the other, the request will be interpreted as a command. It is
phrased in the language of requesting permission in order to express
politeness, by giving a superficial choice to the addressee. In fact the
power relationships dictate that when the police make a request and
they could apparently compel the suspect to carry out the request, the
suspect will view the request as a command."6
Even if there is no proof that most persons view the author-
ity of the police as inherently coercive, there is strong evidence
that at least certain segments of society will see even the politest
"request" by an officer that way." 7  Specifically, many African-
Americans, and undoubtedly other people of color,"8 know that
"16 Peter Tiersma, The Judge as Linguist, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 269, 282 (1993); accord
Rotenberg, supra note 2, at n.63 (drawing analogy between demands in Milgram ex-
periment, which were often made "weakly," not backed by meaningful sanctions, and
a "request" by police officer to search, where a person may face consequences and
sanctions.)
17 Statistics compiled by the state police of NewJersey, for example, show that mi-
nority motorists are far more likely to consent to a search than white motorists. Char-
les Stile, Profiling Attributed to Lack of Divesity, THE REC., March 22, 2001, at Al; see also
Lassiter, supra note 109, at 118, 123 (a study in Florida showed police searched blacks
6 times more frequently than white motorists stopped for minor traffic offenses; in
Utah, fifty percent of traffic stops are Hispanic, and a majority consent to vehicle
searches); David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling
and Stops and Searches without Cause, 3 U. PA.J CONST. L. 296, 312 n.94 (2001) (citing
to the following statistics: on one highway in which African-Americans constituted less
than twenty percent of all drivers, of the 1590 searches conducted, sixty-three percent
were of African-Americans, and thirty percent were of whites).
1 The fear of police officers is shared by many people of color, not just African-
Americans. A Hispanic resident of a Los Angeles Housing project described his reac-
tion to the police as follows: "Sometimes I think of the L.A. police officers in the
neighborhood as soldiers of a hostile foreign army who harass good citizens and
commit untold acts of brutality." Hector Tobar, Police Fear, Need Shapes Pico-Aliso, L.A.
TIMES, April 28, 1991, at BI, in Ward, supra note 109; see also Richard W. Cole & Laura
Maslow-Armand, The Role of Counsel and the Courts in Addressing Foreign Language and
Cultural Barriers at Different Stages of a Criminal Proceeding, 19 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 193,
205-09; Charles J. Ogletree et al., BEYOND THE RODNEY KING STORY: AN INVESTIGATION
OF POLICE CONDUCT IN MINORITY COMMUNITIES (1995).
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refusing to accede to the authority of the police, and even seem-
ingly polite requests-can have deadly consequences. As Pro-
fessor Terry Maclin argues:
Black men know that a different law exists on the street. Black men
know they are likely to be stopped at anytime, and that when they ques-
tion the authority of the police, the response from the cops is often swift
and violent. This applies to black men of all economic strata, regardless
of their levels of education, and whatever their job status or place in the
community." 9
It is not the intent of this Article to provide an extensive
documentation of police abuse, particularly against people of
color. Suffice it to say that such abuse is well documented and
non-controverted.2 Rather, the point I am making is this.
Given this sad history, it can be presumed that at least for some
persons of color, any police request for consent to search will be
viewed as an unequivocal demand to search that is disobeyed or
challenged only at significant risk of bodily harm."' And this
presumption applies even to those who have not personally suf-
fered at the hands of the police-although it would likely apply
most obviously to those who have.
Even judges in some candid moments have recognized this
presumption. For example, Judge Oberdorfer noted that if
he were authorized to so find, he would hold that a thirty-two
..9 Maclin, supra note 85, at 253.
121 See Erwin Chemerinsky, An Independent Analysis of the Los Angeles Police Depart-
ment's Board of Inquiy Report on the Rampart Scandal, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 545 (2001);
Scott Glover & Matt Lait, 10 More Rampart Cases Voided, L.A. TIMEs, January 26, 2000,
at BI (discussing Rampart scandal); David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence be
Contained?, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 465 (1992).
121 See supra notes 117-125 and accompanying text.
'2 This recognition is often expressed in a dissent, or made in passing without in-
fluencing the decision. When a judge uses this justification to suppress evidence,
however, there may be severe consequences, at least in high profile cases. For exam-
ple, one district court judge, Harold Baer, suppressed evidence in a case, in part on
the ground that flight from police by residents of a minority community in New York
may be reasonable, given the belief by many there that the police are "corrupt, abu-
sive and violent." See U.S. v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). An up-
roar over his comments erupted, escalating into demands by some for the judge's
impeachment. Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice be Done
Amid Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Judges from Office for Unpopular Decisions ?, 72 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 308, 310, 311 (1997). Even President Clinton became involved in the fray.
Alison Mitchell, Clinton Presses Judge to Relent, N.Y TIMEs, March 22, 1996, at Al. Sub-
sequently, Judge Baer vacated his decision. U.S. v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), affd, 201 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2000).
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year old black male familiar with the District of Columbia police
department and who had at least one violent altercation in the
past with the police, "could reasonably fear that if he . . .de-
clined to permit a search of his underwear that he would be
forcibly restrained, if not beaten, or ... shot.' 23 Justice Page, in
an eloquent dissent in another case, made a similar point:
I speak from the perspective of an African American male who was
taught by his parents that, for personal safety .... it is best to comply
carefully and without question to the officer's request. It is a lesson that
I have taught my children and, in fact, it is one that I follow to this day. 24
Given the reality faced by the African-American community,
a court's nimble assertion that a person can 'Just say no" to a
police request to search is a sorry, empty slogan. It is no more
based in reality than the tooth fairy or Santa Claus. Rather, the
reality facing African-Americans and other members of minority
groups is this: they are more likely to be stopped, and more
likely to be asked to consent to a search of their persons and
property because of their color. And, because of the experi-
ences in their community, they will frequently-if not usually-
feel coerced to forego their constitutional right of privacy. The
idea of a voluntary consent in such circumstances is a fantasy. 25
C. THE LOSS OFJUDICIAL INTEGRITY
There is a final problem with the consent doctrine as cur-
rently construed by the courts. That is, the cost of litigating
consent may be too high. By the nature of the dispute, the in-
tegrity of the police department as well as that of the judiciary
suffers immeasurably.
26
121 U.S. v. Alexander, 755 F. Supp. 448, 452-53 (D.D.C. 1991). This is one of those
rare cases in which the search was found involuntary on the grounds that the suspect
would have felt cornered by the police after being asked several times to consent, and
given that the suspect would have detected the police officer's "aggravation" when he
resisted. See also United States v. Layman, 730 F. Supp. 332, 342 (D. Colo. 1990)
("[A]ny reasonable traveler, and especially two out of state young black men in the
company of two uniformed and armed white law officers.., in rural Colorado would
not have felt that he could do anything other than sign the consent to search.").
124 State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 106 n.4 (Minn. 1999). Not surprisingly, there
was no mention of race in the majority opinion.
2' See Sklansky, supra note 32, at 320-21 ("consent" and "voluntariness" are, in the
context of constitutional criminal procedure, legal fictions).
12 The ramifications of this loss of trust in the system are severe. As Professor Cole
wrote, "[t]hose who view the performance of police and courts negatively... are less
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How is this so? The problem is that the validity of consent
often comes down to conflicting tales. The suspect may deny
that the officer even requested consent, or, if he concedes the
request was made, may deny granting it.27 Even if he admits
consenting, the suspect may argue that it was begrudgingly
given, or that the officer drew his gun and asked in an intimi-
dating tone. The police officer, on the other hand, may main-
tain precisely the opposite: he asked for consent, in a polite
tone of voice, and the suspect without hesitation said yes. The
question of voluntariness, therefore, comes down to a question
of credibility, with often no witnesses besides the suspect and
the police officer. I can think of few other issues in the criminal
justice system that inherently rely so heavily on a swearing con-
test between officer and suspect; rarely does so much depend
on persons recounting precise words and actions without wit-
nesses or any formal way to memorialize the conversation at the
128time.
likely to play by the rules. Most significantly, people's 'views about authority are
strongly connected to judgements of the fairness of the procedures through which
authorities make decisions."' COLE, supra note 9, at 172 (quoting TOM R. TYLER, WHY
PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 38 (1990)).
127 See, e.g., Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W. 3d 323 (Tex. Crim App. 2000); United
States v. Poulack, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1029 (D. Neb. 1999); Rokitski v. State, 715 So.
2d 859, 861 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997); People v. Herrara, 935 P.2d 956 (Colo. 1997);
United States v. Bribane, 931 F. Supp. 245, 247-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); United States v.
Ruffino, 592 F. Supp. 409, 415 (N.D. Ill. 1984); United States v. Park-Swallow, 105 F.
Supp. 2d 1211, 1213 (D. Kan. 2000) (defendant denied being asked for consent, offi-
cer said she said "go ahead").
'28 The closest analogy is probably to the question of whether a suspect has re-
ceived, and asserted or waived his Miranda rights. Although this raises very similar
issues, there are some reasons to believe that the testimony concerning Miranda is
more reliable. First, Miranda warnings are often given in situations with witnesses
and in the more formal setting of the stationhouse. Second, and relatedly, the giving
of Miranda warnings is often videotaped. See William A. Geller, Videotaping Interroga-
tions and Confessions, in THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAw, JUSTICE & POLICING 303 (Richard
A. Leo & George C. Thomas eds., 1998) (in 1990, about a third of all police depart-
ments serving more than 50,000 people were videotaping). Two states require video-
taping of at least some interrogations. See Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1157
(Alaska 1985); State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994). Finally, the rights
guaranteed by Miranda are widely known and accepted. See Charles Weisselberg, Sav-
ing Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 109, 110 (1998) ("Miranda v. Arizona may be the
United States Supreme Court's best known decision. Anyone who has watched a tele-
vision police drama during the last 30 years undoubtedly has heard the famous warn-
ings."); see also Marcy Strauss, Silence, 35 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 101 (2001).
See also the problem of pretextual searches, where it is easy for the police office
officer to claim that he pulled someone over for not wearing a seatbelt, or for failing
to signal when changing lanes. See supra note 9.
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One problem, of course, is perjury. The officer may lie, not
only to preserve the evidence for trial, but also to prevent being
accused of a bad search. The extent of police perjury in con-
sent cases is, of course, unquantifiable. "By their very nature,
successful lies will remain undetected."'' 29  But anecdotal evi-
dence and some empirical studies document that police perjury
is a serious problem. One former Police Chief candidly admit-
ted his belief that much "testilying" occurs at suppression hear-
ings with respect to consent searches:
Hundred of thousands of police officers swear under oath ... that the
defendant gave consent to a search. This may happen occasionally, but
it defies belief that so many drug users are ... so dumb as to give cops
consent to search ... when they possess drugs."'
Professor Dripps, after surveying the available studies, con-
curred: "The available evidence strongly indicates that police
perjury is a widespread phenomenon."
Hopefully, the system can ferret out times of perjury, and
there are circumstances where the court has found the officer's
testimony to be "incredible."'32 But more often judges are in-
clined to accept the testimony of a police officer in a swearing
"' Morgan Cloud, People v. Simpson: Perspectives on the Implications for the Criminal
Justice System:Judges, Testilying and the Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1341, 1356-57
(1996).
"3 Joseph McNamara, Has the Drug War Created an Officer's Liar's Club?, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 1996, at M1. Every year, I have several students in my criminal procedure
class report to me that they refused officer's consent, only to have the officer say
"thank you for agreeing," and then proceeded to search.
"' Donald A. Dripps, Police, Plus Perjury, Equals Polygraphy, 86 J. CRiM. LAw &
CRIMINOLOGY 693, 693-94 (1996). Professor Dripps recommends the introduction of
polygraph testimony in certain "swearing contests." Id.; see also Stanley Z. Fisher, 'Just
the Facts, Ma 'am ": Lying and the Omission of Exculpatory Evidence in Police Reports, 28 NEW
ENG. L. REv. 1, 36-38 (1993); Myron Orfield, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An
Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CI. L. REv. 1016 (1987) ("virtually all
of the officers admit that the police commit perjury, if infrequently, at suppression
hearings"); Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67
U. COLO. L. REv. 1037, 1039-40 (1996). But see Kevin Reitz, Testilying as a Problem of
Crime Control: A Reply to Professor Slobogin, 67 U. COLO L. REV. 1061, 1062 (1996) (sug-
gesting problems with studies on extent of perjury).
112 See, e.g., Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d. 323 (Tex. Crim App. 2000) (videotape
showed truth); People v. Herrera, 935 P.2d 956 (Colo. 1997); United States v. Bris-
bane, 930 F. Supp. 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); People v. Massiah, 367 N.Y.S. 73, 75 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1975) ("We cannot credit the testimony of the police officer that the [de-
fendant] an ex-felon, would consent to a search with knowledge that the contraband
sought was in the room in open view. We refuse to credit testimony which has the
appearance of having been patently tailored to nullify constitutional objections.").
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contest with a criminal defendant. "Hence, absent some signifi-
cant discrepancies.., factual disputes over whether consent was
in fact given are overwhelmingly resolved in favor of the state."'33
As one judge put it:
I am dubious [of the defendant's claim] that Trooper Stanczyk, a thir-
teen year veteran of the Nebraska State Patrol, would have ordered him
to open the back of the truck without asking for his consent. Also, [the
defendant] a convicted felon, and presently charged with possessing a
substantial amount of marijuana, has everything to gain by testifying that
he did not consent to the search. . . . I therefore choose to credit
Trooper Stanczyk's version that he asked for, and received.., consent to
search.54
Moreover, even when judges suspect something is "fishy,"
they are reluctant to side with the defendant. There are a num-
ber of judges who admit that they have found consent in situa-
tions where they are fairly sure it is a fiction, but they feel they
have no choice. 5 Many judges understandably are uncomfort-
able accusing the police of blatant lyin on the stand unless the
evidence is starkly against the officer. As one judge put it,
... David S. Kaplan & Lisa Dixon, Coerced Waiver and Coerced Consent, 75 DENY. U. L.
REv. 941, 947 (1997); Dripps, supra note 131, at 696:
In a swearing context, the trial judge can discredit the police testimony only by branding
the police as liars and accepting the word of an apparent felon. Typically the police, rather
than the felon, will be telling the truth, but in a significant number of cases, the police ac-
count is false. Nonetheless, judges decide cases one at a time, so the police almost always
win the swearing contest.
"' United States v. Poulack, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1029 (D. Neb. 1999); see also State
v. Boyd, 695 N.E.2d 843 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (accepting police officer's version);
State v. Peterson, 964 S.W.2d 854, 857-58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (same).
And there are racial aspects to this issue as well. "[B]lack defendant's may face
greater challenges in asserting credible denials of consent than their white counter-
parts." Lassiter, supra note 109, at 81.
"' See United States v. Heath, 58 F.3d 1271, 1276 (8th Cir. 1995) (McMillian, J.,
concurring) ("The police officers' saccharine account of the events.., leaves a bitter
aftertaste. . . . The [fact] that the [defendant] would so willingly consent to the
search ... of the shoe box, which he knew contained drugs ... is surprising, to say
the least."); see also ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE, xxii (1987) (Rule VIII: Most
trial judges pretend to believe police officers who they know are lying); Paul Sutton,
The Fourth Amendment in Action: An Empirical View of the Search Warrant Process, 22 ClM.
L. BuLL. 405, 416 (Sep/Oct 1986) (quoting numerous judges); cf Anthony G. Am-
sterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV.
785, 792 (1970) ("Trial judges ... and magistrates ... are functionally and psycho-
logically allied with the police .... The result [in resolving testimony conflicts be-
tween police and suspect] is about what one would suspect").
"6 Cloud, supra note 129, at 1377-78.
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"[M]any times, I feel the police are lying, but I can't make a
finding on a hunch." 7
When police officers discover that they are successful on the
stand in convincing the court of the validity of their actions,
moreover, it may encourage them to be more reckless in the
field. A suspect's "no" becomes a yes more easily in court if the
officer is convinced that he can get away with such testimony.
138
There is a more subtle problem with determining volun-
tariness based on the testimony of police officers, however, and
that problem is likely even more pervasive than perjury. That is,
police officers will "hear" what the suspects say, and remember
the words in a way that conforms to the officers' desire to be
able to search and to have the evidence admissible in court.1
39
In other words, police officers, like other people, "hear what
they want to hear. 140  Social psychology studies demonstrate
that individuals perceive information selectively. Information is
held and processed according to what that person wants to
"' Dripps, supra note 131, at 700. Professor Dripps believes that "the judge might
well believe that the police lie in a fifth of the cases, and yet never make a finding of
police perjury in a single case." Id.; see also Carol Chase, Rampart: A Crying Need to Re-
store Police Accountability, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 767 (2001) ("Although judges are aware
that officers lie to preserve cases, they are reluctant to catch officers in their lies, es-
pecially when the consequence of doing so will lead to the suppression of evidence
which is essential to proving the prosecution's case.").
' See David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM. J. CRiM.
L. 455, 465 (1999) ("One of the strongest reasons that police lie in court is the simple
fact that judges allow them to get away with it."). See also Irving Younger, The Perjury
Routine, NATION, May 8, 1967, at 596 ("the policeman is as likely to be indicted for
perjury... as he is to be struck down by thunderbolts from an avenging heaven").
... See RICHARD R. BOOTZIN ET AL., PSYCHOLOGY TODAY 218-19 (1986) (emphasizing
the "importance of selective attention": "The gatekeeper to our memory is a process
known as selective attention .... Only those few stimuli that we select for focused at-
tention will be registered firmly in our memory .... Stimuli that affect our goals and
self-esteem, or those of our loved ones, interest us."); see also NICKY HAYES, FOUNDATION
OF PSYCHOLOGY 39 (1994) (summarizing a study that found individuals perceive sen-
tences on controversial topics in different ways, "which suggests that individual differ-
ences in values and attitudes are a major factor in [human perception.]"); id. at 59-60
("we are continually surrounded with rich sources of information, from all our
senses, and we interpret that information in ways that are most useful to us."); cf
Maclin, supra note 85, at 385 ("an officer may falsely ... add a fact ... to validate a
consent search-particularly where she perceives that the judiciary has imposed un-
realistic barriers to the efforts to snare drug traffickers.").
40 In the words of a Simon and Garfunkel song, "and a man hears what he wants
to hear and disregards the rest ...." SIMON & GARFUNKEL, The Boxer, in GREATEST
HITS (1972). For academic support for this proposition, see HENRY GLEITMAN,
PSYCHOLOGY 191-94 (1986).
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hear.' Thus, a police officer that wants to search may hear a
qualified consent as an unequivocal yes.
As time passes, the words used by the suspect become even
more convincingly clear in the police officer's mind. After all,
the officer wants to conform his behavior to the law. Any disso-
nance between his actions (searching) and the law (needing to
have voluntary consent) can be resolved by remembering the
interaction as friendly, the suspect as cooperative.14 ' He selec-
tively recalls those facts that help him feel better about himself
and his behavior, and forgets incongruent factors.'4 4 By the time
of trial, the officer can honestly-in his mind-take the stand
and testify that the suspect clearly and without reservation con-
sented.
44
.. See Marcy Strauss, Juror Journalism, 12 YALE L. & POL'Y. REv. 389, 399 (1994); cf
DONALD VINSON, JURY TRIALS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WINNING STRATEGY 26-27 (1986)
(applying selective perception theories to jurors: "Like everyone else, ... jurors see
what they want to see, hear what they want to hear, and perceive what they want to
perceive .... [Tihis is an unconscious process and can be done without malice by
well meaning and very conscientious jurors.").
... See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNIrVE DISSONANCE 260 (1957) (discussing
how people try to reduce internal inconsistencies between their beliefs and observa-
tions). As Professor Festinger writes, "The basic background of the theory consists of
the notion that the human organism tries to establish internal harmony, consistency
or congruity among his opinions, attitudes, knowledge and values. That is, there is a
drive down consonance among cognitions." Id. When cognitive elements are in con-
flict, individuals tend to view their experiences in a modified manner, by employing,
among other things, selective recall. Id. at 11.
"' See BOOTZIN ET AL., supra note 139, at 237 (summarizing selective recall studies
by Loftus and Greenwald: "Motivations also can create distortions, causing us to re-
member ourselves in a more favorable manner than we deserve, so that our memories
become self serving.. .Our self-serving memories are rarely attempts to deceive others;
rather they are unconscious reconstructions that bolster our self esteem, so that we
can continue to think of ourselves in a positive light.").
"' SeeJUDTrrH GREENE, MEMORY, THINKING AND LANGUAGE 79-81 (1987) (People re-
member their interpretation of utterances rather than the exact words).Even with the
Speedy Trial Act, there may be significant gaps of time between the search and the
trial. See, e.g., United States v. Nuyens, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1309-10 (M.D. Fla. 1998)
(testimony of police was credible, "despite notable inconsistencies resulting from the
passage of two years since the search"); J. Andrew Read, Comment, Open-Ended Con-
tinuances: An End Run Around the Speedy Trial Act, 5 GEO. MASON L. REv. 733 (1997).
It is not only the police officer that will suffer from selective perception and
memory problems over time. The suspect will likely share the same fate. I must con-
fess to personal knowledge here. About six months before I wrote this article, I had
the pleasure of approximately ten police officers converging on my house to com-
plain about my teenage son's frankly out of control party. Agreeing with the officers,
the party was broken up, and the police watched five hundred teens leave my back-
yard. When virtually all the kids were gone, the officers went into the backyard "to
look around." Even though I was obviously aware of my rights, and all the criminal
procedure issues and cases related to search and seizure were flashing through my
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The problem of police officers "honestly misremembering"
the circumstances surrounding consent is exacerbated by two
related problems. First, a suspect is more likely to be equivocal
than to come right out and clearly say "no" to a search request.
Even if the situation surrounding the consent search is not
deemed coercive, it will at least be somewhat tense. In such
situations, a person is likely to be uncertain and tentative in
their communication with the officer. 45 This gives the officer
room to claim that, while he did not remember the exact words,
the person had no objection to the search. 46  While it may be
difficult for an unequivocal "no-absolutely not" to be recalled as
a "yes" over time, a suspect's wavering ("Well, I don't know, I
guess so") is more readily converted into a clear agreement to
search in the memory of the officer. As Professor Hayes noted,
"[b]ecause people tend to remember what they think they
heard, or what they expected to hear, rather than what was lit-
erally said, they often remember the message as having been far
more definite than it really was."
147
Moreover, the law of consent-unlike confessions"S-does
not preclude the police from trying to "persuade" the suspect to
mind (did the police have probable cause? Exigent circumstances?), I frankly would
be unable-even after just a few months-to accurately recollect all that they said to
gain access to the backyard and what I said in return. I'm not even positive that they
asked my permission to go into the backyard or whether they simply went back there.
Even without any obvious show of force, and even in my own home I was nervous, in-
timidated, and frankly embarrassed dealing with so many officers.
The event remains a "blur" in my mind. Luckily, since nothing was found, the
event safely can remain a distressing blur.
' And this may be particularly true for certain cultures, women, and people of
color. Professor Ainsworth, in a comprehensive study of a suspect's use of language
and asserting the right to counsel, made this point. Janet Ainsworth, In a Different
Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police Interrogations, 103 YALE L.J. 259 (1993).
Even if the suspect's words are unequivocal, the dynamics of the situation may
lead to confusion about whether the suspect consented. Typically these will be re-
solved against the suspect. For example, in one case, the police asked: Do you mind
if we search-is it ok? Lyons v State, 735 N.E.2d 1179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). The sus-
pect replied, "yeah." The police officer testified that this response proved that there
was consent to search. The suspect testified that there was no consent. Rather, ac-
cording to the suspect, the officer asked if he minded if the police searched, and the
suspect said "yeah"-that is, yeah, he did mind! The court held that the consent was
voluntary. Id. at 1185-86.
'46 See State v. Ready, 565 N.W.2d 728, 817 (Neb. 1997) (police officer testified at
trial that although he could not recall the exact words, he was sure that she did not
object).
117 HAYES, supra note 139, at 38.
14' Under the Fifth Amendment, once a suspect says that they want to remain si-
lent, or asserts the right to an aftorney (unequivocally), the police must cease ques-
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consent. An officer does not have to take "no" as absolute, or
accept the suspect's reluctance. 9  The law does not preclude
the police from "wearing down" the suspect to obtain consent.
Thus, the following hypothetical scenario is not only lawful, it is
likely to occur:
Police Officer: "Mind if we look around?"
Suspect: "Well...."
Police Officer (bit more menacing, touches gun, or shifts holster): "You
got a problem with it? Gonna give me some trouble here?"
Suspect: "I really don't..."
Police Officer (sounding a bit impatient and even more menacing, leans
toward the suspect): "You got a problem here? Can we look around?"
Suspect (shrugs in resignation): "Go ahead then."
And how does this scenario replay at trial? The police offi-
cer testifies that in a normal tone of voice (being macho and
tough-sounding is normal police talk), without guns drawn, he
tioning. See Davis v. United States 512 U.S. 452 (1994); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
477 (1981) (accused who requests counsel cannot be subject to further interrogation
outside presence of attorney unless accused initiates conversation and waives rights);
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (police must scrupulously honor defendant's
assertion of right to remain silent-means questions must cease). See generally, Marcy
Strauss, Reinterrogation, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 359 (1995) (discussing the invoca-
tion of the right to counsel, and the ability of the police to re-question a suspect who
has invoked his right to counsel).
' See, e.g., Krise v. State, 718 N.E.2d 1136 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (defendant's
roommate initially refused to consent, but eventually consented after being asked
several times; court found it voluntary), rev'd on other grounds, 746 N.E.2d 957 (Ind.
2001) (Supreme Court held that roommate did not have actual or apparent authority
to consent to search of defendant's purse); see also United States v. D'Armond, 80 F.
Supp. 2d 1157, 1162 (D. Kan. 1999) (court noted that defendant initially took "um-
brage" at the request to search and then consented; held consent voluntary); Davis v.
United States, 328 U.S. 582, 586 (1946) (over the course of an hour, defendant sev-
eral times refused to open a locked inner room, and finally did open it; defendant
claimed that officer said if he didn't open it, the agents would break down the door,
court did not credit this testimony); but see State v. Monroe, 630 N.W.2d. 223, 227
(Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (citing State v. Kiekhefer, 569 N.W.2d 316, 324 (Wis. Ct. App.
1997)) (initial refusal "militates against finding of voluntariness").
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asked the suspect if he minded if they looked around, and the
suspect willingly said, "go ahead." Gone are the nuances, the
hesitation, the body language. Even if the police officer relays
that the suspect initially refused, but then changed his mind,
voluntariness is likely to be found.150 Indeed, showing that he
"knew" he had the right to refuse may work against the suspect.
Concededly, other issues in a criminal trial rely on the in-
tegrity of police officers. But the area of consent uniquely fos-
ters an environment that encourages or promotes officer
perjury. Even with the best of intentions and honesty, it is likely
asking too much from officers to expect them to accurately re-
create the exact words, ambiance, subtle body language, and
every other aspect of the situation that is so crucial to under-
standing the voluntariness of a consent search.
When police officers lie, the criminal system obviously suf-
fers. That injury is magnified manifold when the court tacitly
accepts that deception. Even when officers "honestly"
misremember or selectively recall details, faith in the integrity of
the system and its ability to render fair and objective justice is
perverted. Because the voluntariness doctrine inherently rests
on such imprecise memory at best and purposefully distorted
recollections at worst, its utility can be questioned.
III. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: REJECTING CONSENT
In the previous section I argue that the determination of
voluntariness is currently confused, misapplied, and based on a
fiction. Moreover, determining voluntariness raises significant
concerns about the integrity of the judicial system. So what
should be done about it? In this section, I propose a conced-
edly radical solution: eliminating consent. But first, commonly
proposed, less drastic solutions are considered and rejected as
ineffective and undesirable.
A. PROVIDING WARNINGS
One alternative that has oft-times been proposed for ensur-
ing a voluntary consent is to reject the holding in Schneckloth
and require that police officers tell individuals that they have
the right to refuse consent, that such a refusal would not be
150 See supra notes 148-50.
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held against them, 5' and that any evidence found during the
search can be used against them. Indeed, many scholars have
advocated such a position, arguing that a true and knowing
choice requires knowledge of options and consequences.12
Moreover, many scholars and even police officers persua-
sively contend that, contrary to the assertion of the Court in
Schneckloth, providing a warning would not hinder law enforce-
ment.' First, warnings would not lead to the end of consent;
the experience with Miranda warnings show that many people-
indeed most people-still waived their rights after being pro-
5' Whether a refusal to allow consent can be used against the suspect has yet to be
decided. See COLE, supra note 7, at 33 ("The courts have never clearly answered a ba-
sic question: can the police use an individual's exercise of his right to say no as a basis
for developing suspicion justifying a non-consensual search?"). Some courts have
suggested that a person's refusal to consent should be considered a factor in deter-
mining whether the officer has reasonable suspicion to detain a person or to under-
take other investigatory techniques. Id.; see United States v. Withars, 972 F.2d 837,
843 (7th Cir. 1992); cf United States v. Holloman, 113 F.3d 192, 193 (11th Cir. 1997)
(driver refused consent, police used narcotics dog to sniff); United States v. Taxa-
cher, 902 F.2d 867 (11th Cir. 1990) (warrant to search based on suspect's nervousness
and withdrawal of consent); cf Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (flight
from police can be factor in determining reasonable suspicion to stop).
Other courts have suggested that the refusal to consent cannot be used against
the suspect. United States v. Carter, 985 F.2d 1095, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United
States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1417 n.4 (8th Cir. 1989) (refusal to consent cannot be
support for reasonable suspicion); cf. United States v. Hyppolite, 65 F.3d 1151 (4th
Cir. 1995) (refusal to search cannot establish probable cause to search. "A contrary
rule would vitiate the protections of the Fourth Amendment.... Indeed, the Fourth
Amendment would mean little if officers could manufacture probable cause by asking
questions until a suspect either consents or exercises constitutional rights.").
The answer to this question has obvious import. As Professor Cole noted, "If the
police can use a citizen's negative answer against her, then she is not truly free to say
no .... The very fact that the law is unclear on this point means that a citizen...
cannot know whether her choice to say no will be held against her." COLE, supra note
9, at 33.
512 See, e.g., Barrio, supra note 35; Rebecca Stack, Note, Airport Drug Searches: Giving
Content to the Concept of Free and Voluntary Consent, 77 VA. L. REV. 183 (1991). See gener-
ally 3 WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIzURE: A TREATISE ON THE FouRTH AMENDMENT §
8.1, 8(1) (a) (1-5) (1996) (listing articles in support of this proposition).
'5 SeeJames A. Adams, Crime and Punishment Symposium: Search and Seizure as seen by
Supreme Court Justices: Are they Serious or is this just Judicial Humor?, 12 ST. Louis U. PUB.
L. REv. 413, 446-49 (1993); see also Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 52 n.12 (1996)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the fact that many law enforcement agencies do
incorporate warnings into their Fourth Amendment consent forms); Michael R.
Bromwich & William J. Bratton, Police Have Good Reasons to Support Miranda Warning,
B. GLOBE, Feb. 7, 2000, at Al5.
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vided such warnings." Second, many departments currently
require or encourage their officers to tell suspects of their right
not to consent before obtaining consent to search.
"[I] nstructors in many police training programs.., recommend
such warnings as a sound police practice, likely to bolster the
voluntariness of a consent to search."'55 Despite the fact that
many officers do inform suspects of their rights, no one has
suggested that law enforcement has floundered in those areas.156
I agree that a voluntary consent, at a minimum, requires
that police officers tell a suspect from whom they are seeking
consent of the right to refuse. I disagree, however, that these
warnings are much of a panacea, and do not solve all of the
problems with the consent doctrine.
First, it is unclear whether being told of the right to refuse
really dissipates coercion. It is police officers providing the in-
formation in the same coercive environment that existed be-
fore; individuals who distrust and fear the police are likely not
reassured by such a warning. 57 Since many believe that police
officers routinely ignore and violate other rules and limitations
on their authority, why should this be any different simply be-
cause the police officers are forced to tell the suspect of his
rights? Ironically, the evidence used to deny that warnings
harm law enforcement interests thus can be seen as a double
edged-sword. The argument that providing such warnings will
not significantly decrease the number of consent searches does
dispute that law enforcement interests are harmed, but at the
same time it provides some evidence that coercion may still per-
sist.
Moreover, because the police are allowed to try to persuade
a suspect to consent, even after an initial rejection of permis-
sion, it is questionable whether suspects will believe that the of-
ficer is truly prepared to honor their wishes."" More importantthan knowledge of one's rights is the belief that police are pre-
15' Lassiter, supra note 109, at 82-83; see also Jan Hoffman, Miranda ruling losing effec-
tiveness through court, police action, S. BEND TRi., Mar. 29, 1998, at A5 (stating that some
officers have found eighty percent or ninety percent of suspects waive their rights).
' State v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762, 771 n.6 (Ohio 1997) (quoting Amicus
Curaie Brief for Americans for Effective Law Enforcement) (Robinette III).
'5 See Barrio, supra note 35.
Lassiter, supra note 109, at 132.
"' See supra notes 148-50; see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 479 (1981);
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 454-55 (1966).
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pared to honor those rights. If a person rejects a search request
(or believes that he or she did) and the police officer ignores
that rejection by continuing to request permission or wear down
the person's will, the suspect may become convinced that his or
her wishes will not be respected, regardless of the warning.5 9
The suspects may learn from the warnings that they have a right
to say no, but the officer's behavior tells them that that if they
do so, they will be bothered and harassed until they "decide" to
say yes.
Second, warnings may be a necessary, but not a sufficient so-
lution to the problems of consent because police officers can
still lie about or misremember whether such warnings were even
given.' 6' As Professor Dripps noted in an analogous context,
"[t] old that the test of a confession's admissibility is not volun-
tariness but a waiver made after warnings, unscrupulous police
officers will simply lie about giving the warnings and getting the
waiver."'' 61 While a written consent form informing the suspect
of their rights may mitigate some of this problem, it does not
erase it. This form may be signed after a party has already con-
sented (without such warnings); signing a form with the written
warning once a suspect verbally has committed to allowing a
search does not resolve whether the decision to consent was
made with full knowledge of these rights.' 6
Thus, requiring police officers to tell a person that he has a
right to refuse consent is a step in the right direction toward al-
leviating coercion, but does not go far enough. Taking this
baby step, moreover, may have the unfortunate, unintended
consequence of preventing further reform. In other words,
some may believe that implementing this proposal solves the
problems with coercion, and thus may divert attention and ef-
forts from true, more meaningful reform. It may diffuse inter-
"' See Samira Sadghi, Comment, Hung up on Semantics: A Critique ofDavis v. U.S., 23
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 313, 332 (1995) (making analogous argument in Miranda con-
text).
"0 See, e.g., People v. Brazzel, 18 P.3d 1285, 1287 (Colo. 2001) (defendant said po-
lice officer lied about giving him his Miranda warnings).
If police officers were to videotape every encounter, that certainly would help.
That may not be viable in many settings, however, in which consent is sought. See
United States v. Kreisel, 210 F.3d 868, 869 (8th Cir. 2000) (viewing of videotape con-
vinced court consent was voluntary).
... Dripps, supra note 131, at 697.
"' See State v. Meyers, 695 N.E.2d 327, 329 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (signed consent
form one hour after search began).
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est in the needed solution, either eliminating consent alto-
gether if possible, or, in the alternative, developing some means
to assess and give weight to cultural and racial responses to po-
lice authority.
B. WARNINGS PLUS AN AWARENESS OF SUBJECTIVE, CULTURAL
COERCIVE FACTORS
Another possible solution is to not only require police offi-
cers to inform suspects of their rights, but also to reinforce the
requirement that coercion be assessed from the subjective view-
point of the defendant, including consideration of the defen-
dant's race. Thus, courts would give careful and considerable
attention to the background of the consenter and whether his
prior personal experience or group cultural experience with the
police may have affected the decision to consent.'
Again, while this may have some advantages over the court's
current approach, I do not believe it is a viable solution to en-
sure "voluntariness." First, as mentioned before, even if judges
conscientiously considered these factors, they may still have dif-
ficulty truly understanding their significance and identifying the
depth of the fear and intimidation experienced by other cul-
tures or classes.164 Second, this mandate to consider subjective
factors does not eliminate the issues of perjury and distortion; it
is still reliant on police testimony concerning the nature of the
request to search and the suspect's responses. It is only the ex-
planation for that response that lies exclusively within the prov-
ince of the defendant.
Moreover, it may be undesirable to promote a system so
governed by an almost infinite number of subjective factors.
Criminal procedure rules are:
primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-day activities
and thus ought to be expressed in terms that are readily applicable by
the police .... A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts
of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and
hairline distinctions, may be the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile
'6 See Robert V. Ward, Consenting to a Search and Seizure in Poor and Minority Neigh-
borhoods: No Place for a "Reasonable Person, "36 How. L.J. 239 (1993).
... See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but they may be literally im-
possible of application by the officer in the field .
A rule that recognizes not only the past experience of the sus-
pect, but also past experiences of members of his ethnic or ra-
cial group obviously provides no guidance to the police in the
field. How can an officer obtaining consent factor in these vari-
ables?1 '6
Finally, such a rule may lead to a perception that the system
is unfair. Many may perceive that people of color, or immi-
grants from police states are gaining some advantage in the
criminal justice system that they do not have. Letting an Afri-
can-American prevail on a suppression motion because he can
honestly claim that he felt coerced by the show of police author-
ity, while a white, middle class person may not have the same
option, may strike some as a strange form of "affirmative ac-
tion.
,,167
If subjective factors are so problematic, why not simply
make it an objective test: would a reasonable person feel co-
erced in the circumstances? Or, as in Connelly, why not simply
look at the actions of the police to see if they behaved in a coer-
cive manner? There are several problems with abandoning the
subjective approach. First, and most fundamentally, an objec-
tive approach would not be consistent with the Constitution and
the mandate of the Fourth Amendment here. Consent searches
are valid not because a reasonable person would have consented
in a particular circumstance, but because this person did. Con-
sent is a personal waiver of Fourth Amendment rights, a per-
sonal relinquishment of rights of privacy."" It is reasonable for
1' New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (quotations omitted) (discussing
the need for clear and concise rules concerning search incident to arrest); see also
Arizona v Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682 (1988) (praising a rule for providing "clear
and unequivocal" guidelines to law enforcement).
66 One author, after conducting a study of police training concludes that police
officers are "much better able to work with specific, clearly-delineated policies than
with vague exhortations to consider all the circumstances," although even when
forced to work with vague rules, they do try to follow the law. Corey Fleming Hiro-
kawa, Making the "Law of the Land" the Law on the Street: How Police Academies Teach
Evolving Fourth Amendment Law, 49 EMORY L.J. 295, 328 (2000).
167 See Sklansky, supra note 32, at 327-28.
1 See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 483 (1981) ("The issue in Schneckloth was
under what conditions an individual could be found to have consented to a search
and thereby waived his Fourth Amendment rights."); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S.
483, 489 (1964) ("It is important to bear in mind that it was the petitioner's constitu-
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police to search not because the police behaved in a non-
coercive manner, but because the person chose to let the police
invade his private space. That is why the Court in Schneckloth
emphasized repeatedly that voluntariness must be shown in fact
in this particular case, and that this person must have voluntar-
ily consented.'6 9
Second, objective factors by definition marginalize the real
life experience of millions of people-people of color. So long
as the reasonable person is likely a reasonable white person, the
voices of those traditionally excluded from the justice system
continue to be unfairly silenced.' 70
So the bottom line is this. A rule requiring the court to
consider subjective factors such as racial and psychological re-
sponses to police authority is essential to ensure voluntary con-
sent. Yet, such a rule would be difficult for the courts to apply,
and impossible for the police to implement. In other words, the
voluntary consent doctrine is inherently flawed, and piecemeal
attempts to solve its problems are doomed to failure. There is
an inescapable contradiction in the doctrine of consent. Thus,
the only viable solution undoubtedly is the most radical: elimi-
nating consent.
C. ELIMINATING CONSENT
Given that "voluntary consent" under the Fourth Amend-
ment is often an oxymoron, and that the system isn't capable of
sifting the "truly voluntary" from the coerced, why not simply
eliminate the consent exception? What would be lost were the
police no longer able to obtain a person's consent to search? In
Schneckloth and subsequent cases, the Court identified two main
reasons for allowing consent searches. 7' First, consent searches
tional right ... at stake .... It was a right, therefore, which only the petitioner could
waive."); Davies, supra note 11, at 26; see alsoJohn B. Wefing &John G. Miles, Consent
Searches and the Fourth Amendment: Voluntariness and Third Party Problems, 5 SETON HALL
L. REv. 211, 215 (1974) ("the issue [in consent] is whether the protections of the
Fourth Amendment have, in fact, been waived by a party with authority to do so").
... Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973). This position may be in-
consistent with the current law on third party consent. See supra notes 67-68 and ac-
companying text. To extent it is, I believe that the third party consent rules are
misguided. See generally Davies, supra note 11.
171 See Dana Raigrodski, Breaking Out of "Custody": A Feminist Voice in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1301, 1326-27 (1999).
7' Actually, the law enforcement interests were part of the balance in determining
"voluntariness" in Schneckloth. Considering this factor in that context is problematic.
As Alan Wertheimer, a professor of philosophy noted, "it is not clear that society's le-
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promote the interests of law enforcement. Second, individuals
may benefit from voluntary consent, and in any event should
have the right to decide whether they want to allow the police to
engage in a search. 72 Although both reasons have surface ap-
peal, neither withstands close scrutiny.
Consider first the argument that consent searches enhance
law enforcement and crime fighting. By definition, such
searches permit the police to look for incriminating evidence
even when they lack probable cause to search.'73 Moreover,
even if there is probable cause to search, obtaining a warrant
may be time consuming or inconvenient. "A consent search al-
lows an officer to bypass paperwork and the need to locate a
magistrate who can issue a warrant. ,174
Finally, even if the police have probable cause to search,
and even if procuring a warrant would not be onerous, an offi-
cer may elect to obtain consent because it increases the likeli-
hood that the search would be deemed valid. In other words,
"'because of the various constitutional and statutory require-
ments which attend the issuance and execution of a search war-
rant,' the police may perceive the consent search alternative as
the surest method of reducing the chances of the evidence be-
ing suppressed at trial."'75
gitimate need for searches can or should be accommodated 'in determining the
meaning of "voluntary" consent.' Not only does society provide for nonconsensual
searches, but however important society's need for searches, it arguably has nothing
to do with the voluntariness of consent." ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 117 (1987).
172 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225.
' 7 See id. at 227 ("In situations where the police have some evidence of illicit activ-
ity, but lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search authorized by a valid consent
may be the only means of obtaining important and reliable evidence." ). It is not
clear what the evidence of illicit activity was in Schneckloth. As least one court is trou-
bled by idea of searching without any suspicion at all. Harris v. State, 994 S.W.2d 927,
932. n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (police officer testified that he "asks for consent to
search every vehicle that he stops, regardless of any suspicion of illegal activity. In our
opinion, this is a questionable practice"). The New Jersey consent decree to end ra-
cial profiling bans consent searches unless the officer has reasonable suspicion. See
infra note 194.
174 David S. Kaplan & Lisa Dixon, Symposium on Coercion: An Interdisciplinary Exami-
nation of Coercion, Exploitation and the Law: Coerced Waiver and Coerced Consent, .74 DENV.
U. L. REv. 941, 948 (1997); see State v. Walker, 965 P.2d 1079, 1087 (Wash. 1998) (po-
lice officer testified that he relied on consent and did not get a search warrant be-
cause it was time consuming).
17' Barrio, supra note 35, at 220 (quoting 3 WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 8.1, at 147 (2d ed. 1987)). My discussions
with a number of police officers confirm this; they all said that even if they believed
that they had legal justification to search, they would still try to ask for consent; cf
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Although police officers undoubtedly gain at least a mini-
mal efficiency advantage from consent searches, the magnitude
of these interests are unclear. Nowhere have any of these ar-
guments been empirically validated. 7 6 And police officers' la-
ment that their hands will be tied, and that the amount of crime
will explode if they could not undertake consent searches, must
be viewed skeptically. Police officers have a reputation of at
least slight exaggeration of the dire consequences of any limits
on their authority. After all, police departments virtually in uni-
son insisted that they would be totally ineffective in fighting
crime if the exclusionary rule were applied to the states in the
1960s.' 7 Similar doomsday predictions followed the Miranda
decision, and its requirement that suspects be warned before
the police could engage in custodial interrogation. 17 8
Nonetheless, even in the absence of empirical evidence, the
argument holds at least surface appeal. Just like it seems intui-
tively obvious that people feel coerced by authority figures, the
argument that law enforcement benefits from consent searches
makes sense. The real question is how much weight to give such
an argument in the absence of any empirical support. The an-
swer, I ultimately conclude, is not much.
First, of course, enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness
of law enforcement cannot be the only rationale for consent
searches. Police would undoubtedly uncover evidence of crimi-
nal activity that might otherwise go undetected were they given
free reign to search a person's property. Yet, no one suggests
such a prospect. As the Supreme Court noted:
[T] he mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can
never by itselfjustify disregard of the Fourth Amendment.... The inves-
tigation of crime would always be simplified if warrant were unnecessary.
But the Fourth Amendment reflects the view of those who wrote the Bill
of Rights that the privacy of a person's home and property may not be
United States v. Chavez, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1022 (W.D. Mo. 1999) (could search
bags incident to arrest so didn't need consent).
"' Rotenberg, supra note 2, at 190 ("Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's obser-
vation that 'a legitimate need for [consent] searches' exist, the case for need has not
been made." (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973))).
'77James Stribopoulos, Lessons From the Pupil: A Canadian Solution to the American Ex-
clusionary Rule Debate, 22 B.C. INT'L & COmP. L. REv. 77, 104 (1999); see Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 659-60 (1961).
171 Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective
on Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1057 (1998);
StephenJ. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 435, 455-56 (1987).
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totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in enforcement of
the criminal law. 9
Moreover, there is strong reason to believe that crime con-
trol would not unduly suffer were the police no longer able to
obtain consent to search. First, in many-if not most-contexts
the loss of consent does not mean the loss of evidence, arrest or
conviction. Consent searches often are used in circumstances
where the police also have probable cause to search, but don't
want to go to the "trouble" of getting a warrant. Thus, the harm
from eliminating consent searches is that police officers must
do additional paper work and suffer annoyance by obtaining a
warrant, and not the failure to apprehend and convict a dan-
gerous criminal.
If there is no time to obtain a warrant, the police can en-
gage in a search based simply on probable cause under the exi-
gency exception.' Moreover, the "hassle" of getting a
warrant-if a constitutional requirement can be so described-
surely can be minimized in this technological era. Use of fax
machines, e-mail, cell phones, telephonic warrants and other
such advances make the obtaining of a warrant less trouble-
some."" Undoubtedly, future innovations can only speed up or
lesson the onerous nature of the process. The point is that in
many cases where a consent search is undertaken, the criminal
17 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978)).
180 Exigency is another exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. .See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967); see also United States v. Strickland, 902 F.2d 937, 942 (11th Cir.
1990) (while police exceeded permissible scope of consent, probable cause and exi-
gency existed to justify search); United States v. Romero-Garcia, 991 F. Supp. 1223
(D. Or. 1997) (even if consent invalid, had exigent circumstances); State v. Edwards,
735 A.2d 723, 729 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (Del Sole, J., concurring) (did not need to
reach consent issue because police had probable cause and exigency); cf People v
Berr, 731 N.E.2d 853 (Il. App. Ct. 2000) (even if no consent, was plain view).
"' See Donald L. Beci, Fidelity to the Warrant Clause: Using Magistrates, Incentives and
Telecommunications Technology to Reinvigorate Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 73 DENV.
U. L. REV. 293, 295 (1996) ("with current computer and electronic telecommunica-
tion technology, police officers can now swiftly obtain a warrant without leaving the
area of investigation"); Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MiCH.
L. REV. 1468, 1471-72 (1985) (discussing warrant model based on telephonic war-
rants); Michael John James Kuzmich, www.warrant.com: Arrest and Search Warrants by E-
mail, 83 MicH. L. REv. 590 (1999) (discussing California's use of e-mail for warrants);
Geoffrey P. Alpert, Telephonic Search Warrants, 38 U. MIAMI L. REv. 625 (1984); see also
People v. Peck, 38 Cal. App. 3d 993, 1000 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (upholding constitu-
tionality of telephonic warrants).
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would still be apprehended without using consent with, at worst,
minimal additional duties placed on the police. 82
What about those cases without probable cause? Again, it
may be worthwhile to probe deeper. There are two possible
scenarios. The first is the situation where the officer has rea-
sonable suspicion but not probable cause. Reasonable suspi-
cion would not typically enable a police officer to engage in a
search, but it does allow him to stop and question the person
for a brief period of time.8 3 If a consent search cannot be un-
dertaken in this situation, does serious harm to law enforcement
entail? Again, the answer is not necessarily-and certainly not
184in every case.
Consider an example to illustrate my point. A police officer
pulls Mr. A's car over because he has reasonable suspicion to be-
lieve that Mr. A has just engaged in a drug interaction. If the of-
ficer cannot obtain Mr. A's consent to search the car, is all lost?
Of course not. The officer, based on reasonable suspicion, has
the right to seize and detain A and question him for a limited
period of time.85 He can obtain Mr. A's name and address. He
'82 See, e.g., United States v. Hernendez, 76 F. Supp. 2d 578, 582 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1999)
(criticizing police for not obtaining a warrant before search based on consent be-
cause they had probable cause and time to get a warrant).
8' See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (discussing meaning of
seizure); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (upholding stop and frisk based upon rea-
sonable suspicion of criminal activity and reasonable suspicion suspect is armed).
The police officer stopped the suspects in Terry because they "didn't look right" to
him. It should be noted that the two men stopped in Terry who didn't look right
were African-American. See Thompson, supra note 9. The defendant in Mendenhall
was also African-American.
'8' For example, it appears that significant time and energy is wasted in situations
where police officers ask consent to search every car pulled over, and find nothing.
Studies show various levels of success from searches; almost all indicate a fairly small
payoff. For example, in 1997, the California Highway Patrol stopped 34,000 cars, and
seized contraband in two percent of the stops. Rudovsky, supra note 7, at n.40. Data
by the Maryland police department show that police officers recovered evidence in
thirty percent of the cars searched. Maclin, supra note 85, at 350-51 (1991). But this
figure seems to include suspicion-based as well as consent searches; the amount of
time evidence is discovered with no suspicion at all is not delineated. Another study
found contraband in only five percent of the searches. Id. at 354. See also Smith, su-
pra note 34, at 928 (had the police found no evidence of contraband in the vehicle,
the consent search in Schneckloth may have seemed a waste of police resources).
1' Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (discussing right to stop an individual based on reasonable
suspicion). Even if the officer simply believes that Mr. A committed a traffic offense,
the same scenario can play out. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). The
police, however, cannot randomly pull over a car, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
649 (1979), unless the car is being stopped as part of a valid checkpoint, see Michigan
Dept of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
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can order Mr. A out of his car, 86 and whatever he sees-or
smells1 5-in the car or on Mr. A may be the basis for a further
search.1
8 8
If all these efforts fail-if the questioning does not make the
reasonable suspicion ripen to probable cause and no other in-
criminating information is gleamed-the officer must let Mr. A
go. But that does not end the investigation. Rather, the police
officer, if he still suspects that A is somehow engaged in crimi-
nal activity, can then engage in traditional law enforcement in-
vestigatory techniques. It is possible that patient, detailed police
work will yield even greater results than a consent search.' 9 For
example, if the officer watches Mr. A's home, perhaps he'll dis-
cover others involved in the drug trafficking in which he sus-
pects Mr. A engages.'90
"' Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (allowing police to order driver
out of car on stop); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997) (allowing police to order
passengers out of car).
187 See, e.g., State v. Huges, 607 N.W.2d 621, 627 (Wis. 2000) (smell can be basis for
probable cause).
u Police can search an automobile based solely on probable cause, without a war-
rant. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). They can search the pas-
senger compartment of a car without probable cause if they arrest a recent occupant
of a car and take that person into custody. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454
(1981); see also Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (inventory search of entire
car after arrest upheld). Moreover, police can engage in a limited search of a car for
weapons if they have reasonable suspicion that there may be such weapons in the car.
See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). What they see during this search in plain
view may be seized. Id.
189 To some extent, I may have picked the easiest example to demonstrate alterna-
tive methods of investigation by choosing the car. Concededly, a police officer who
fails to gain consent to search a house is much more limited in options. Without
probable cause, there is virtually no way to search a home. But this should be consid-
ered a strength, not a weakness. The Supreme Court has just recently re-affirmed the
sanctity of the home-any difficulty in gaining access should be lauded, not la-
mented. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) ("'At the very core' of the
Fourth Amendment 'stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there
be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."' (quoting Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961))).
Even without consent, the police can use other investigatory techniques to either
obtain probable cause, or, failing that, leave the homeowner alone.
"0 Some have made this argument with respect to the Court's decision in Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). In Gates, the Supreme Court watered down the test for
establishing probable cause based on an anonymous tip. Professor Kamisar has ar-
gued that had the court not made it easier on the police to get a warrant in such a
situation, and if the police had been forced to continue to investigate to obtain prob-
able cause under the old, two pronged standard, they might have apprehended "big
time drug dealers." Yale Kamisar, Gates, Probable Cause, "Good Faith" and Beyond, 69
IowA L. REv. 551, 576 (1984). As it was, the police arrested Sue and Lance Gates, who
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So now the question becomes: how often, when the officer
has reasonable suspicion to search, would he or she be unable
to obtain probable cause based on investigatory techniques be-
sides a consent search? And that answer does not even reveal
the true cost of eliminating consent. It must be further queried
how often, in those cases in which reasonable suspicion does
not ripen into probable cause, is there evidence of illegality that
does not get discovered? After all, some cases of reasonable
suspicion do not turn into probable cause because there is no
real basis for the suspicion. The only harm to law enforcement
comes from being unable to find contraband or other pertinent
evidence of criminal activity.
Obviously, no empirical evidence exists to answer any of
these questions. If I had to wager a guess, however, I'd suggest
that the bottom line is pretty small. The gap between probable
cause and reasonable suspicion is not so vast that it cannot typi-
cally be bridged by officer-citizen interaction short of a consent
search.' '
Now consider the second scenario: the situation where the
officer has no suspicion at all. In such a case, the officer can
only engage in a consensual encounter, which is an extremely
brief interaction short of a seizure. Certainly the police officer
is more limited here, both time-wise and in the scope of the
questioning. At some point, the detention may become illegal
because by its length or nature, a reasonable person would not
feel free to leave, and thus, the consensual encounter turns into
a seizure, requiring reasonable suspicion. So the window to ob-
tain consent to search in these kinds of encounters are fairly
limited to begin with.' 9
pled guilty to drug charges and were sentenced to probation. DRESSLER & THOMAS,
supra note 9, at 156.
... Probable cause exists when there is a fair probability that contraband or evi-
dence of a crime will be found. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). "Rea-
sonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause." Alabama v.
White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). Reasonable suspicion exists when police officers are
able to articulate some minimum level of objective justification for stopping a person.
It must be more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch," but less
than probable cause. Id. at 329 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). See
C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief Quanta of Evidence or Constitutional
Guarantee?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1325 (1982) (discussing difference between prob-
able cause and reasonable suspicion).
" At some point a consensual encounter becomes either too long, see United
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985), or so intrusive, see Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491
(1983) that it turns into a seizure that must be justified by reasonable suspicion.
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Even if consent searches do take place with some frequency
here, the loss of such searches again can only be judged by the
same questions posed above. How often would the "interaction"
yield at least some information that might provide reasonable
suspicion or probable cause even without a consent search?
And, perhaps more important, how often do searches con-
ducted with absolutely no suspicion at all yield evidence of
criminal activity? Although the evidence is somewhat raw, what
does exist strongly suggests that searches conducted without any
suspicion rarely yield evidence of a crime.Y Of course, even if
contraband happens to be found in such situations, it should be
remembered that consent to search in this situation is also the
most problematic, because it is the arena that race can figure in
most prominently. In other words, an officer may be more
likely to stop and request consent on a "lark" to search from an
African-American male than a white person.""
The point I am making is a simple one: a laundry list of law
enforcement benefits from consent searches have been oft-
repeated in the caselaw, with little real discussion. With no em-
pirical evidence to support it, and significant arguments sug-
gesting that the benefit is minimal at best, the argument for
permitting consent searches based on the needs of law en-
forcement appears weak at best.
Besides promoting law enforcement interests, consent
searches are often lauded as enhancing individual interests as
' See supra note 184 and accompanying text. It is also worth asking what type of
evidence is typically discovered during a search without any reasonable suspicion. In
other words, if I had to hazard an educated guess, I would guess that much of what is
discovered involves minor possessory offenses-a joint or a small amount of a con-
trolled substance. My point is not to minimize these offenses, but to point out that it
is unlikely that major felonies get "cracked" this way. It would be interesting to dis-
cover not only how often police turn up evidence of a crime or contraband during
consent searches without any suspicion, but also how often they end up prosecuting
based on such evidence. The true cost of consent must take into account all these
variables, most particularly the nature of the evidence discovered.
"' See supra note 9 and accompanying text. In fact, some have suggested that po-
lice not be able to seek consent in the absence of some reasonable suspicion. See
State v. Munroe, 630 N.W.2d 233 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (court troubled by fact police
tried to get consent to search hotel room without any suspicion at all). In the con-
sent decree issued in NewJersey to end racial profiling, state troopers are prohibited
from requesting consent to search a motor vehicle unless they can articulate reason-
able suspicion that the search would reveal evidence of a crime (and they must tell
the suspect that they have the right to refuse). See Consent Decree, U.S. v. State of
N.J. CA. No. 99-5970 (D.N.J. 1999); see also State v. Hampton, 754 A.2d 567 (N.J. Su-
per. Ct. App. Div. 2000).
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well. The argument is that persons should have the ability to
decide whether or not they wish to exercise their constitutional
right to be "let alone." And, it is argued, an individual may have
a good reason to permit a search without a warrant. For exam-
ple, an innocent person may deflect suspicion and avoid the
embarrassment of further police investigation by agreeing to a
search. 95
Again, at face value, this argument seems compelling.
Surely an individual who "truly wants" the police to search-
who would benefit from it-should be allowed to do so. Norma-
tively, the idea that individual choice should be thwarted in or-
der to preserve free will seems perverse. But consider the
argument more closely.
The argument that individuals should have the right to de-
cide whether to consent really has two separate parts that must
be proven. First, do individuals truly benefit from allowing the
police to search based on consent? If the answer to that is yes,
would it then be fair to remove that choice from them? Even if
the answer to that question is no, it must still be asked whether
it nonetheless would be fair to remove choice from an individ-
ual who might believe that consent is in her best interest.
Do individuals benefit from police searches because they
can stop further investigation and deflect suspicion? I must
admit that originally I accepted this argument at face value. I
heard or read the argument so often, that I really didn't initially
consider it more deeply. But on further reflection, I have come
to seriously question this assumption. I tried to imagine scenar-
ios where a person would want the police to search. Take the
example of a person with nothing to hide in the car, which is
pulled over for speeding. This person is a white, nineteen-year-
old teenager with Grateful Dead bumper stickers on an old car.
"' See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488 (1971) (suggesting other
reasons why a person might consent to a search, including the powerful "convention
of openness and honesty"). As the mother of two teenage boys, I read with interest-
and a few chuckles-about an attempt in a middle class suburb to gain consent of the
parents in advance to search their homes for evidence of teen underage drinking. In
a predominantly white, middle class NewJersey suburb, the police chief sent out 2700
consent forms to parents of teenagers, asking them to waive their fourth amendment
rights and allow the police to enter their homes at will to catch teenagers drinking.
The police chief was surprised and disappointed that only twenty forms were re-
turned after four months. See Robert Hanly, An Anti-Drinking Campaign and How it
Flopped, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 28, 1994, at 1, cited in Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth
Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 393 n.173 (1998).
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The police officer writes him a ticket, and then asks if he minds
if the officer looks around inside the car. Now, the young man
has no contraband, but he may have private things in there. He
may be carrying condoms, or a love note, or even his report
card. Yet the argument is that he may benefit from consenting
to the search, because he diverts attention and allows the police
to "leave him alone." But how is that? Based on the facts de-
scribed, the police must leave him alone in any case. The offi-
cer has no suspicion of any further wrongdoing, and thus he
must let the young man go.
Take another scenario where an individual might benefit
from consent. Rumors are circulating that a person is growing
marijuana in his basement, and the police are investigating.
Concededly, the individual might be able to get the police "off
his back" by showing him his basement. But in reality, either
the police have probable cause or they don't. If they have
probable cause, they can (and should) get a warrant to search.
If they don't have probable cause, and their routine investiga-
tion (questioning neighbors, watching the house and so on)
does not provide it, presumably they will also "get off his back."
Moreover, there is no guarantee that a consent search will
stop the investigation, particularly in cases where the police
have strong evidence to the contrary. For example, after an un-
fruitful search, the police might believe that the person "moved
the stuff," but still suspect that there is criminal activity. So, in
cases with strong evidence of criminal involvement, the police
are unlikely to give up simply because a person consented to a
search, and thus, the individual gains marginally, if at all. And
with weak evidence, the police are likely to give up even if no
consent search occurs unless other evidence is obtained. The
point is, either way, permitting consent searches provides mini-
mal, if any, benefit to the individual. It's a classic heads I win,
tails you lose situation.
Finally, consider another scenario where it is oft asserted
that a person benefits from consent. Suppose the police pull
over a car, and claim that they are arresting the driver for drug
dealing, because they have probable cause to believe that she is
carrying cocaine in the red backpack seated next to her in the
car. Isn't this a situation where the innocent driver wins by al-
lowing consent? She shows the police her backpack-even lets
them search the entire car, and no cocaine will be discovered.
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She won't be arrested, and will be free to go. Certainly, a sig-
nificant benefit!
Again, the reality is quite different from the scenario. In
this kind of situation, the police are perfectly free to-and un-
doubtedly will-search the backpack and car, even without con-
sent. Under the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement, the police can search the car and the backpack
based simply on probable cause.196 Under a search incident to
arrest doctrine, the car and the person can be searched. 97 It is
unlikely that a person will be arrested and carted away without
such a search taking place. The consent doctrine adds nothing.
Thus, the actual benefit that an individual obtains from al-
lowing the police to search upon request is minimal at best. But
what about the normative argument-that even in the absence
of actual benefit, it is unfair to take that choice from a person.
Part of being an autonomous human is being able to make the
decision that we wish to make.1 98 Even if there is no real benefit,
the mere fact that some person may think there might be, and
may simply want to consent militates against eliminating the
consent doctrine.
Concededly, this argument has appeal. But ultimately, I
conclude that is it not determinative, and certainly does not
outweigh the problems with the consent doctrine. Indeed, the
arguments against the doctrine-the existence of inherent co-
ercion-suggest that it is almost impossible to separate out
those situations in which a person "truly" wants to consent from
those situations in which a person feels compelled to acquiesce.
Given the inability to ascertain whether there has been a free
choice in some cases, it is better to remove the choice in all
cases.
There is ample support in extraordinary circumstances for
removing choice from an individual when the coercive nature
'" See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798 (1982); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
117 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (court established bright line rule: af-
ter a lawful custodial arrest of an occupant of a car, police can automatically search
the passenger compartment and any containers therein); see also United States v.
Chavez, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1022 (W.D. Mo. 1999) (regardless of whether there was
voluntary consent, search could have taken place under search incident to lawful ar-
rest doctrine).
"' See Marcy Strauss, Toward A Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationships: The Ar-
gumentforAutonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315, 336-39 (1987).
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of the situation cannot be rectified. In such cases, the inherent
coercion exercised by a person in a position of authority over a
subordinate justifies a blanket rule precluding behavior that
concededly some individuals might desire even absent the coer-
cive elements.
Consider, for example, the prohibition on relationships be-
tween subordinates and inferiors in the military. Military rules
against fraternization have existed for centuries, and have been
traced to policies that include maintaining class distinctions in
European feudal society and avoiding undermining leadership
and unit effectiveness by regulating the behavior of officersim
More recently, the concern about possible abuse of power
by the superior officer has been cited as a basis for restricting
fraternization between officers and enlisted personnel. This ra-
tionale for regulating behavior appeared in the Army's first writ-
ten policy on this issue: "Relationships between service members
of different rank which involve, or give the appearance of, par-
tiality, preferential treatment, or the improper use of rank or
position for personal gain, are prejudicial to good order, disci-
pline and high unit morale., 20 The Army's most recent position
on this issue absolutely bans any new romantic relationships be-
tween officers and enlisted soldiers. 0 '
Such prohibitions on romantic relationships might sweep
within its scope some clearly consensual behavior. People do
fall in love, even within the chain of command. But limiting a
person's choice to become involved in this situation is justified
at least in part out of fear that the consensual relationship can-
not be differentiated from the coerced one. As Professor
Chamallas notes:
'9" See C. Quince Hopkins, Rank Matters But Should Marriage? Adultery, Fraterniza-
tion, and Honor in the Military, 9 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 177, 239-240 (1999); see also Ma-
jor Kevin W. Carter, Fraternization, 113 MIL. L. REV. 61, 90-91 (1986).
'0' Id. (citing Army's "first written policy concerning superior-subordinate relation-
ships").
2"L Sgt. 1st Class Connie E. Dickey, Army Announces New Fraternization Policy, ARMY
NEWS SERVICE, March 2, 1999, available at
http//www.dtic.mil/armylink/news/Mar999/al9990305fratpoli.html (last visited
06/13/01). If the relationship existed prior to March 1, 1999, the soldiers have until
March 1, 2000 to get married, break up, or face the consequences. Id.; see also Martha
Chamallas, The New Gender Panic: Reflections on Sex Scandals and the Military, 83 MINN.
L. REV. 305, 332-333 (1998).
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With respect to relationships within the chain of command, a per se ban
on consensual relationships reduces the likelihood that officers will
abuse their power to pressure enlisted women to have sex, knowing that
they will not be able to defend against a charge of sexual misconduct by
alleging that the victim consented to or welcomed the conduct. It could
also be argued that the officer/enlisted soldier relationship is so funda-
mentally. asymmetric that it is simply too difficult to ensure that these
sexual liaisons are not coerced or exploitive. °2
Similarly, sexual relationships between doctors and patients
have been banned, not because all such relationships are coer-
cive, but because it would be impossible to differentiate the
consensual relationship from the involuntary one. The concern
is that a patient's attraction to the physician is not a response to
real life feelings, but a reflection of the patient's feelings regard-
ing a care-giving authority figure. 21 Thus, as the College of Phy-
sicians and Surgeons of British Columbia acknowledge, "even
though we could envision relationships which are consensual
.. . and do not involve exploitation, we concluded that these
cases will be rare and it is better to absolutely prohibit all sexual
contact between physicians and patients."2 4
Finally, some universities have adopted absolute prohibi-
tions on student/faculty relationships. Although such a blanket
rule may sweep "consensual" relationships within its ambit, that
cost is worth the price of ensuring that subtly coercive as well as
overtly coercive relationships are prevented.2 S
In sum, it is not unprecedented to prohibit even potentially
consensual situations because of the difficulty distinguishing be-
tween coercive and welcome interactions. Particularly when
there is a grossly asymmetric power relationship, the concern
202 Chamallas, supra note 201, at 355.
20' See H. Russell Searight & David C. Campbell, Physician-Patient Sexual Contact:
Ethical and Legal Issues and Clinical Guildelines, 36J. FAM. PRAc. 647, 648 (1993); accord
Francoise Baylis, Therapist-Patient Sexual Contact: A Non-Consensual, Inherently Harmful
Activity, 38 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 502, 504 (1993) (stating that because of the power im-
balance inherent in the physician-patient relationship, among other things, a patient
is unable to give valid consent to a sexual relationship).
204 See Catherine S. Leffler, Note, Sexual Conduct within the Physician-Patient Relation-
ship: A Statutory Framework for Disciplining this Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 1 WIDENER L.
SyMp.J. 501, 517 (1996).
... See Patrick Dilger, Putting an End to Risky Romance, YALE ALUMNI MAG., April
1998, at 30 (Yale adopted a policy banning all sexual relationships between teachers
and students over whom they have direct supervisory responsibility). See generally Mar-
tha Chamallas, Consent, Equality and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L.
REv. 777 (1988); Carol Sanger, The Erotics of Torts, 96 MicH. L. REv. 1852 (1998).
[Vol. 92
RECONSTRUCTING CONSENT
for preventing coercion outweighs any concern for individual
choice in regulating relationships in the military, and between
doctor and patient and teacher and student. So it should be
with consent searches. The power imbalance, the likelihood of
coercion, and the difficulty in assessing the voluntariness of the
situation all weigh in favor of a per se ban on consent.
IV. CONCLUSION
Eliminating consent is obviously a drastic solution. None-
theless, I am convinced that stop gap measures of informing the
suspect of their rights, or considering individual subjective fac-
tors more fully, do not go far enough. The radical solution in
this case would not only be more faithful to the Fourth
Amendment, it would greatly enhance faith and trust in the ju-
dicial system. Those benefits, moreover, would come at slight
cost. As I have argued, the harm to law enforcement and to an
individual's autonomy interest is likely to be insignificant."6 At
a minimum, the arguments raised in this paper about the bene-
fits to law enforcement and to an individual hopefully demon-
strate that the presumed necessity for consent searches should
be seriously questioned and not taken at face value in evaluating
the costs of consent searches.
Eliminating consent would require a huge leap of faith, but
a worthy one. It would reaffirm a belief that the police can solve
crime by focusing not on hunches, but on suspicion and prob-
able cause. It would mean police cannot target minorities by
stopping them on the public streets, and then intimidating
them into agreeing to a search of their car-a search that only
rarely yields incriminating evidence, but almost always leaves the
consenter feeling diminished and angry. It would mean that
the dignity of the individual is not overpowered by the authority
206 There is a final cost to abandoning consent that deserves mentioning: it is pos-
sible to police officers, forced to rely on other justification for a search, will abuse or
stretch other theories to enable them to engage in the exact behavior a consent
search would have allowed. And, the concern is that the courts, which I have argued
accept the officer's version of events, would give a wink and a nod to the officer's at-
tempt to search under other theories.
While I am concerned about this prospect, I ultimately conclude that it is not a
justification for keeping the consent doctrine. First, there is nothing to keep the po-
lice from abusing other doctrines now, even with consent available. Second, the ar-
gument that other exceptions to the warrant requirement might get perverted to
make up for any loss (or perceived loss) from not being able to do consent searches
simply argues for enhanced vigilance in these other areas, not keeping consent.
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and power of the police officer. It would mean that the Fourth
Amendment's concern for the privacy of each citizen would be
restored to its rightful place-to be interfered with only when
the government has the proper justification for doing so. It
would be the right thing to do.
